Inside Job(监守自盗)[2010]电影台词本阅读、下载和单词统计

电影名称：监守自盗
英文名称：Inside Job
年代：2010

推荐：千部英美剧台词本阅读

时间	英文	中文
[00:11]		2008年全球经济危机 导致几百万人倾家荡产 失去工作 流离失所
[01:08]	Iceland is a stable democracy with the high standard of living	冰岛是一个稳定的民主化国家 生活水准很高
[01:12]	and until recently	直到最近
[01:14]	extremely low unemployment and government debt	极低的就业率和政府负债改变了这一事实
[01:19]	We had the complete infrastructure of a modern society:	我们具备现代社会的一切基础设施
[01:23]	clean energy, food production,	清洁能源 食物生产
[01:26]	fisheries with a quota system to manage them	配额制管理的捕鱼业
[01:29]	Good healthcare and good education,	良好的医疗服务以及教育
[01:30]		古鲁菲·索伊加 冰岛大学经济学教授
[01:31]	clean air, not much crime,	空气清新 犯罪率低
[01:35]	It’s good place for families to live	很适宜人居
[01:37]	We had almost end of history status	那时候简直是空前的好
[01:38]		安德里·玛戈南森 作家 电影制片人
[01:42]	But in 2000 Iceland	但2000年
[01:43]	government began a broad policy of deregulation	冰岛政府开始推行大规模放松管制政策
[01:47]	that would have disastrous consequences.	这种政策将造成灾难性后果
[01:49]	First for the environment and then for the economy	先是对环境 后是对经济
[01:54]	They started by allowing multinational corporations like Alcova	一开始 他们允许像美铝这类跨国公司
[01:57]	to build giant aluminum smelting plants	建造大型炼铝厂
[02:00]	and exploit Iceland’s natural geothermal and hydroelectric energy sources	大量开发地热和水电能源
[02:05]	Many of the most beautiful areas in the highlands	冰岛高地上那些风景优美
[02:08]	with the most spectacular colors are geothermal	艳丽如画的地区往往富含地热能源
[02:14]	So nothing comes without consequences.	所谓因果报应
[02:54]	At the same time the government privatized	与此同时政府还将
[02:57]	Iceland’s three largest banks	冰岛最大的三家银行私有化
[03:00]	The result was one of the purest experiments	最终使得冰岛彻底成为
[03:02]	in financial deregulation ever conducted	放松金融管制的实验场
[03:15]	Finance took over and uh,	当时金融独大
[03:19]	more or less wrecked the place	基本毁了这个国家
[03:21]	In a 5 year period this three tiny banks	五年之间 这三家小银行
[03:24]	which have never operated outside of Island	在之前从未做过境外操作的情况下
[03:27]	borrowed $120 billion	借入了1200亿美元
[03:30]	ten time the size of Iceland’s economy	是冰岛生产总值的十倍
[03:33]	The bankers showered money on themselves	银行家因此置身银山
[03:35]	each other and their friends	同时惠及他们的朋友
[03:38]	There was a massive bubble	当时泡沫巨大
[03:39]	stock prices went up by a factor of nine,	股价以九倍系数增长
[03:43]	house prices more than doubled.	房价涨幅超过百分之百
[03:47]	Iceland bubble gave rise to people	冰岛的泡沫经济使部分人发达起来
[03:49]	like Jon Asgeir Johannesson	其中就有扬·艾斯格·约翰森
[03:52]	He borrowed billions from the banks	他从银行借了几十亿美元
[03:53]	to buy up high-end retail businesses in London	在伦敦投机高端零售业
[03:56]	He also bought a pinstriped private jet,	他还买了带条纹的私人飞机
[03:59]	a $40 million yacht	4千万的游艇
[04:01]		价格: 25000000 维护费: 19493 首付: 20%
[04:01]	and a Manhattan penthouse	还有一间曼哈顿顶层公寓
[04:04]	Newspapers always had headlines:	那会的报纸头条总是
[04:05]	this millionaire bought this company	这个百万富翁在英国 芬兰
[04:06]		安德里·玛戈南森 作家 电影制片人
[04:07]	in UK or in Finland or in France or wherever	法国或是其他地方收购某公司
[04:13]	Instead of saying this millionaire took a billion dollars loan	而不说这位百万富翁是从冰岛本国银行
[04:19]	to buy this company	贷款十亿美元
[04:21]	and it took it from your local bank	来收购这家公司
[04:24]	The banks set up money market funds	银行还发行了货币市场基金
[04:26]	and the banks advised deposit-holders to	并鼓励储户
[04:28]	withdraw money and put them in a money market funds	取出存款 投入货币市场基金
[04:30]		一种欺骗性投资运作 吸引投资者不断投入但最后以项目崩溃为由卷走资金
[04:30]	The Ponzi scheme needed everything it could, huh?	庞氏骗局就是尽量搜刮 不是吗
[04:34]	American accounted firms like KPMG	美国会计师事务所 比如毕马威
[04:37]	audit the Iceland’s banks and investment firms	对冰岛的银行做过审计
[04:40]	and found nothing wrong.	没发现任何问题
[04:42]	And American credit rating agencies	美国的信用评估机构
[04:44]	said Iceland was wonderful	还说冰岛情况好极了
[04:46]	In February 2007.	2007年的2月份
[04:46]		西格里德·本尼斯托蒂尔 冰岛议会特别调查员
[04:49]	the rating agencies decided	这些评估机构决定
[04:50]	to upgrade the banks	将银行的信用等级
[04:52]	to a highest possible rate AAA	提升至最高等级 AAA级
[04:55]	It went so far as the government here	甚至政府官员都与银行家一起旅游
[04:57]	traveling with the bankers as a PR show.	以此作为公关秀
[05:05]	When Iceland’ banks collapsed at the end of 2008	2008年底 冰岛银行业崩溃后
[05:08]	unemployment tripled in 6 months	6个月内失业率翻至三倍
[05:14]	There is nobody unaffected in Iceland	这场危机下 无人幸免于难
[05:24]	– So a lot of people here lost their savings – Yes that’s the case	-很多人倾家荡产 -就是这么回事
[05:28]	The government regulators	作为政府监管机构
[05:30]	who should’ve been protecting the citizens of Iceland	本应保护冰岛人民
[05:32]	had done nothing.	却毫无作为
[05:35]	You have two lawyers	比如说有两个
[05:37]	from regulator company who’re coming to a bank	监管机构的律师去银行
[05:39]	to talk about some issues.	谈一些事务
[05:41]	When they approach the bank	到了后发现
[05:43]	they would see nineteen SUVs outside the bank	门前停着19辆SUV
[05:49]	so you went to the bank and you have	也就是说进去之后
[05:50]	nineteen lawyers sitting in front of you	有19个律师等着你
[05:54]	that very well prepared,	而且是有备而来
[05:56]	ready to kill any argument you make	将你所有异议扼杀掉
[05:59]	And then if you do very well	你要是表现特别好的话
[06:01]	they offer you job	他们就会拉你入伙
[06:03]	One third of Iceland’s financial regulators	冰岛金融监管机构里三分之一的人
[06:06]	went to work for the banks	都跳槽去了银行
[06:09]	But this is universal problem,	但这个问题是全球性的
[06:12]	in New York you have the same problem, right?	纽约也有这种问题 不是吗
[06:46]	What do you think of Wall Street incomes this days?	你觉得如今华尔街的收入情况如何
[06:49]	Excessive	过高
[06:50]		保罗·沃尔克 前美联储主席
[06:53]	I’ve been told that it’s extremly difficult	有人告诉我说国际货币基金组织(IMF)
[06:55]	for the IMF to criticize United States.	根本没有资格批评美国
[06:58]	I wouldn’t say that	我不这么认为
[06:59]		多米尼克·斯特劳斯-卡恩 国际货币基金总裁
[07:06]	We deeply regret our breaches of US law.	我们为违反本国法律 深感后悔
[07:13]	They’re amazed at	说来令人震惊
[07:15]	how much cocain these Wall Streeters can use	华尔街人每天吸食那么大量的可卡因
[07:18]	and get up and go to work the next day.	然后第二天爬起来继续工作
[07:23]	I didn’t know what credit default swaps are	我不知道信用违约互换是什么
[07:27]	I’m little bit old fashioned	我比较守旧
[07:29]		乔治·索罗斯 亿万富翁 投资家 慈善家
[07:34]	Has Larry Summers ever expressed remorse?	拉里·萨默斯有过忏悔之意吗
[07:37]	I don’t hear confessiones	我不听别人的忏悔的
[07:39]		巴尼·弗兰克 美国金融服务委员会主席 美国众议院议员
[07:54]	The government just writing checks	政府只管写支票
[07:55]	that’s plan A, that’s plan B and that’s plan C.	这是A计划 那是B计划 那是C计划
[07:59]	Would you support legal controls on executive pay?	您支持法律监管高管薪酬吗
[08:02]	I would not	不支持
[08:05]		大卫·麦考密克 布什政府财政部副部长
[08:08]	Are you comfortable with	您对金融服务业
[08:10]	law of compensation in financial service industry?	薪酬制度满意吗
[08:12]	If they’ve earned it, then yes, I am	如果是他们应得的 我就满意
[08:14]	– Do you think they’ve earned it? – I think they warranted.	-你觉得是他们应得的吗 -我觉得是
[08:16]		斯科特·塔波特 美国金融服务业圆桌组织首席说客
[08:19]	And so you help these people blow the world up?	这么说你帮这些人把世界搞的天翻地覆?
[08:22]	You could say that.	可以这么说
[08:33]	They were having massive private gains at public loss.	他们从公众的损失中获益匪浅
[08:37]		沈联涛 中国银监会首席顾问
[08:45]	When you start thinking	你一旦想到
[08:46]	that you can create something all of nothing	自己可以无中生有之后
[08:48]	it’s very difficult to resist	这个诱惑会让你无法抗拒
[08:50]		李显龙 新加坡总理
[09:04]	I’m concerned that a lot of people want go back to the old way	我担心很多人会想重蹈覆辙
[09:08]	the way they were operating prior to the crisis	恢复危机之前的行事方式
[09:11]		克里斯汀.拉嘉德 法国财政部长
[09:21]	I was getting a lot of anonymus e-mails from bankers	我每天收到银行家们无数的匿名信
[09:24]	saying “You can’t quote me,	说到”请别署名”
[09:26]	but I’m really concerned”	“但我真的很担心”
[09:28]		吉莲·邰蒂 《金融时报》美国版总编辑
[09:33]	Why do you think there isn’t	你为什么觉得
[09:35]	a more systematic investigation being undertaking?	他们没在进行全面调查
[09:38]	Because then you will find the culprits	因为那样就会找到罪魁祸首
[09:41]		鲁里埃尔·鲁比尼 纽约大学商学院教授
[09:44]	Do you think that Columbia Business School	你觉得哥伦比亚商学院
[09:45]	has any significant conflict of interest problem?	有什么明显的利益冲突吗
[09:49]	Don’t see that we do	好像没有
[09:50]		格伦.哈伯德 布什政府首席经济顾问 哥伦比亚商学院院长
[09:58]		埃利奥特·斯皮策 纽约州州长(2007-2008) 纽约州检察长(1999-2007)
[10:00]	The regulators didn’t do their job	监管人员没有尽到职责
[10:02]	They had the power to do every case	我任州检察长时那些案子
[10:04]	that I made when I was state attorney general.	他们都完全有能力解决
[10:06]	They just didn’t want it.	他们就是不想解决
[10:25]	Over the weekend, Lehman Brothers one of the most venerable	本周末 雷曼兄弟公司 这个曾经备受敬仰
[10:27]	and biggest investment banks,	同时也是最大的投资银行
[10:29]	was forced to declare itself bankrupt	被迫宣布破产
[10:30]	Another, Merrill Lynch, was forced to sell itself today	另有美林银行 也于今天迫出售
[10:33]	Crisis talks are underway…	危机言论正在蔓延
[10:34]	World financial markets are way down today	全球金融市场今日陷入低迷
[10:37]	following dramatic developments for two Wall Street giants….	随之而来的是两位华尔街巨头戏剧性的收场
[10:46]	In September 2008	2008年9月
[10:48]	the bankruptcy of US investment bank Lehman Brothers	美国雷曼兄弟投资银行破产
[10:52]	and the collapse of the world	世界第一大保险公司
[10:53]	largest insurance company AIG	美国国际集团(AIG)崩塌
[10:56]	triggered the global financial crisis.	引发了全球性金融危机
[10:58]	…fears gripped markets overnight	一夜之间 恐惧弥漫了整个市场
[10:59]	with Asian stocks slammed by…	亚洲股票板块狂跌…
[11:01]	Stocks fell off a cliff	股价出现跳水
[11:02]	the largest single point drop in history	创下有史以来单日最大跌幅
[11:05]	Share prices continued to tumble in	雷曼公司资产清算过程中
[11:07]	the aftermath of the Lehman collapse	每股份额不断走低
[11:12]	The result was the global recession	最终导致全球经济低迷
[11:14]	which costs the world tens of trillions of dollars	造成数万亿美元的损失
[11:17]	rendered 30 millions people unemployed	三千万人口失业
[11:20]	and doubled the national debt of the US	美国国家负债翻番
[11:23]	If you looked at the costs of it:	危机造成社会经济结构受损
[11:23]		鲁里埃尔·鲁比尼 经济顾问委员会成员 纽约大学商学院教授
[11:25]	the structure of equity wealth, of housing wealth	包括产权资产结构 住房资产结构
[11:28]	then the structure of income, of jobs,	收入结构和工作结构
[11:31]	15 million people globally	全球1500万人
[11:33]	could end up below the poverty line again	可能要重回贫困线以下
[11:38]	This is just a hugely, hugely expensive crisis	这场危机代价实在太大 太大了
[11:42]	This crisis was not an accident	这场危机并非偶然
[11:45]	It was caused by an out of control industry.	一项失控的产业导致了这场危机
[11:48]	Since the 1980s	自20世纪80年代起
[11:50]	the rise of US financial sector has led to a series	美国金融业的崛起已引发一系列
[11:53]	of increasingly severe financial crises	一次甚于一次的经济危机
[11:57]	Each crisis has caused more damage	危机所致损失逐次增大
[12:00]	while the industry has made more and more money	该行业所得收益却日趋增多
[12:11]	After the Great Depression, United States	经济大萧条之后四十年里
[12:14]	have 40 years of economic growth	美国经济持续增长
[12:16]	without a single financial crisis	此间没有发生经济危机
[12:19]	the financial industry was tightly regulated	金融业处在严密监管下
[12:22]	most regular banks were local businesses	大多数银行都是本地产业
[12:24]	and they were prohibited from speculating	同时 法律禁止银行动用储户资金
[12:26]	with depositors savings	进行投机行为
[12:29]	Investment banks which handle stock and bond tradings	投资银行 作为处理股票债券业务的银行
[12:32]	were small private partnerships.	当时都是小型私人合伙机构
[12:35]	In the traditional investment banking partnership model	传统的投资银行伙伴关系模式
[12:36]		萨缪尔·海斯 哈佛商学院投资银行业名誉教授
[12:39]	the partners put the money up	是各位合伙人集资
[12:41]	and obviously the partners watch that money very carefully	所以大家都密切注意这笔钱的动向
[12:45]	They wanted to live well	他们希望生活富足
[12:46]	but they didn’t want to bet the ranch on anything	但却不想拿钱冒任何风险
[12:49]	Paul Volcker served on the treasury department	保罗·沃尔克当时在财政部供职
[12:53]	and was chairman of the Federal Reserve from 1979 – 1987	并于1979年至1987年间担任美联储主席
[12:57]	Before going into government,	进入政府部门之前
[12:59]	he was a financial economist at Chase Manhattan Bank	他是大通曼哈顿银行的一名金融分析师
[13:03]	When I left Chase to go in Treasury in 1969	1969年我离开大通进入财政部时
[13:08]	I think my income was in the neighbour of $45000.	收入大约是45000美元吧
[13:11]	$45000 a year.	每年45000
[13:12]	Morgan Stanley in 1972	1972年摩根斯坦利
[13:16]	had approximately 110 total personnel	旗下大约有110名员工
[13:21]	One office and capital of $12 000 000	一个办公室 1200万美元资产
[13:26]	Now Morgan Stanley has 50 000 workers	现在他们有五万雇员
[13:31]	and has capital of several billion	数十亿资产
[13:36]	and has offices all over the world	全球各地均有办事处
[13:38]	In the 1980s the financial industry exploded	20世纪80年代金融业大爆炸
[13:41]	The investment banks went public	投资银行上市
[13:43]	given them huge amount of stock holding money	股票发行为其融集大量资金
[13:47]	People on Wall Street started getting rich	华尔街的人越来越富有
[13:51]	I had a friend who was a bond trader	我有一个朋友上世纪70年代
[13:53]		查尔斯·莫里斯 《两万亿的消融》作者
[13:54]	at Merilyn Lynch in 1970s	在美林银行做债券交易
[13:59]	He had a job as a train conducter at night	他晚上兼职做列车调度员
[14:03]	Because he had 3 kids	因为他有三个孩子
[14:04]	and couldn’t support them	做债券交易赚的钱
[14:06]	on what a bond trader made	无法养活孩子
[14:08]	By 1986 he was making millions of dollars	到1986年 他年收入就几百万了
[14:11]	and thought it was because he was smart	我还以为是因为他聪明
[14:15]	The highest order of business before the nation	目前国家经济建设的重中之重
[14:17]	is to restore our economic prosperity	就是要恢复经济繁荣
[14:20]	In 1981 president Ronald Reagan	1981年罗纳德·里根总统
[14:23]	choses Treasury Secretary	任命美林银行CEO
[14:25]	the CEO of investment bank Merrill Lynch Donald Regan	唐纳德·里根为财政部部长
[14:29]	Wall Street and the President do see eye to eye	华尔街与总统确实英雄所见略同
[14:32]	I’ve talked to many leaders of Wall Street	我与许多华尔街领袖谈过
[14:34]	they also will be behind the President on 100%	他们也会全心全意支持总统
[14:37]	The Reagan administration	里根政府
[14:39]	supported by economists and financial lobbyist	在经济学家以及金融说客支持下
[14:42]	started the 30 years period of financial deregulations	开始了长达三十年的金融放松管制
[14:47]	In 1982 the Reagan administration	1982年 里根政府
[14:50]	deregulated savings and loan companies	对储贷公司放松管制
[14:53]	allowing them to make risky investments	允许他们动用储户资金
[14:54]	with their depositors’ money	进行风险投资
[14:57]	By the end of the decade	到80年代末
[14:58]	hundreds of saving and loan compnies had failed	数百家储贷公司破产
[15:01]	This crisis cost tax payers $124 billion	这次危机导致纳税人损失1240亿美元
[15:06]	and cost many people their live savings	使许多人的毕生积蓄付诸东流
[15:09]	It may be the biggest bank heist in our history	这可以说是有史以来最大的银行劫案
[15:12]	Thousands of saving and loan executives	几千名储贷公司主管
[15:14]	went to jail for looting their companies	因为抢劫自己的公司而入狱
[15:16]	One of the most extreme cases	其中最极端的例子就包括
[15:18]	was Charles Keating	查尔斯·凯丁
[15:20]	In 1985 when federal regulators	1985年联邦监管机构
[15:23]	began investigating him	开始对他进行调查时
[15:25]	Keating hired an economist named Alan Greenspan	凯丁雇了一位叫艾伦·格林斯潘的经济学家
[15:29]	In this latter to regulators	在这封致监管机构的信件中
[15:30]	Greenspan praised Keating’s sound business plan and expertise	格林斯潘赞扬了凯丁的合理商业计划和管理经验
[15:35]	and said he saw no risk in allowing	还说凯丁用客户的钱投资
[15:36]	Keating to invest his customers money.	在他看来 并无任何风险
[15:40]	Keating reportedly paid Greenspan $40 000	据报道 凯丁付给格林斯潘4万美元
[15:46]	Charles Keating went to prison shortly afterwords	此后不久 查尔斯·凯丁便锒铛入狱
[15:49]	As for Alan Greenspan	而艾伦·格林斯潘
[15:51]	President Reagan appointed him chairman of America’s central bank	则被里根总统任命为美国央行主席
[15:55]	The Federal Reserve	即美联储主席
[15:57]	Greenspan was reappointed	并被克林顿总统
[15:58]	by presidents Clinton and George W. Bush	和乔治·W·布什总统续聘
[16:03]	During the Clinton administration	克林顿政府执政期间
[16:05]	deregulation continued under Greenspan	金融市场在格林斯潘
[16:07]	And Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin,	时任财政部长的罗伯特·鲁宾
[16:10]	the former CEO of the investment bank goldman Sachs	同时也是高盛投资银行前任CEO
[16:13]	and Larry Summers — Harvard economics professor	和哈佛经济学教授拉里·萨默斯的控制下持续自由化
[16:17]	The financial sector of Wall Street being powerful,	华尔街金融业 实力强大
[16:21]	having lobbyist, having lots of money	有自己的说客 资金雄厚
[16:22]	step by step captured the political system	一步一步掌控政治系统
[16:26]	both on the Democratic and the Republican side.	民主党和共和党都有浸润
[16:30]	By the late 1990s	到90年代末期
[16:32]	the financial sector had consolidated into few gigantic firms	金融产业合并为几家巨型公司
[16:36]	Each of them so large	每一家都规模巨大
[16:37]	that their failure can threaten whole system	一旦出现差错 将威胁到整个体系
[16:40]	And the Clinton administration	而克林顿政府
[16:42]	helped them grow even larger	则助其规模进一步壮大
[16:45]	In 1999 Citicorp and Travelers	1999年花旗公司和旅行家集团
[16:48]	merged to form Citigroup	合并为花旗集团
[16:50]	The largest financial services company in the world.	成为世界最大的金融服务公司
[16:53]	The merger violated the Glass-Steagall act	但这违反了格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案
[16:56]	A law passed after Great Depression	这项法案经济大萧条后通过的法案
[16:58]	which prevented banks with consumer deposits	不允许银行用储户存款
[17:00]	from engaging in risky investment banking activities	进行风险投资银行业务活动
[17:04]	It was illegal to acquire Travelers.	当时买进旅行家集团是非法的
[17:04]		罗伯特·那兹达 格林宁研究所前任所长
[17:07]	Greenspan said nothing.	但格林斯潘什么也没说
[17:09]	The Federal Reserve gave him exemption	美联储免了他们一年税金
[17:11]	for a year and then they got the law passed	然后取消了这项法案
[17:15]	In 1999 at the urging of Summers and Rubin	1999年在萨默斯和鲁宾的敦促下
[17:18]	Congress passed the “Glemm-Leach-Bliley Act”	议会通过了金融服务现代化法案
[17:21]	Known to some as the Citigroup Relief Act	也称花旗集团救济法案
[17:24]	It overturned “Glass-Steagal”	其完全推翻了格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案
[17:27]	and clear the way for future mergers	也为之后的合并铺平了道路
[17:31]		之后罗伯特·鲁宾上任花旗集团副董事长 赚取了一亿两千六百万美元
[17:38]	Why do you have big banks	为什么会出现大银行
[17:38]		威勒姆·布特 花旗集团首席经济学家
[17:39]	because banks like monopoly power	因为银行希望有垄断力
[17:41]	because banks like lobbying power,	希望有说服力
[17:43]	because banks know that when you are too big	因为他们知道一旦规模巨大
[17:48]	they will be bailed	就会有政府援助
[17:50]	Markets are inherently unstable	这个市场有内在不稳定因素
[17:50]		乔治·索罗斯 亿万富翁 投资家 慈善家
[17:52]	or at least potentially unstable	或者说 至少有潜在不稳定因素
[17:55]	and appropriate metaphor is the oil tankers	一个恰当的比喻就是 有一艘油轮
[17:59]	they were very big and therefore	体型非常巨大
[18:02]	you have to put in compartments	因此需要在里面分成隔间
[18:04]	to prevent the sloshing around of oil	防止油乱晃
[18:07]	from capsizing the boat	导致油轮倾覆
[18:10]	the design of the boat has to take it into account	设计船舶时就该考虑这一点
[18:13]	and after the Depression	而大萧条之后
[18:16]	the regulation actually introduced	金融监管就将防水隔间
[18:19]	this very watertight compartments	引入到市场这艘巨型油轮中
[18:22]	and deregulation has led to	而放松管制
[18:25]	the end of compartmentalisation	则终结了这种隔离区划
[18:29]	The next crisis came at the end of the 90s	接下来一场危机发生于90年代末
[18:31]	The investment banks fuel the mass of the bubble in internet stocks	投资银行推动网络股泡沫持续膨胀
[18:36]	Which were followed by a crash in 2001	此后于2001年全面崩盘
[18:38]	that caused $5 trillion dollars in investment losses	造成了五万亿的投资损失
[18:42]	The Securities and Exchange Commission	证券交易监督委员会(证监会)
[18:44]	The federal agency which had been created	作为大萧条期间为管制投资银行业
[18:46]	during the depression to regulate investment banking	而产生的联邦行政机构
[18:49]	had done nothing	毫无作为
[18:51]	In the absence of meaning for federal action	由于联邦监管行为毫无意义
[18:51]		埃利奥特·斯皮策 纽约州州长
[18:53]	and there has been none	而且联邦也无所作为
[18:55]	and given the clear failure of self regulation	鉴于其自我监管已明显失败
[18:57]	It is become necessary for others to step in	现在必须有人介入
[19:00]	and adopt the protections needed	采取必要保护措施
[19:02]	Eliot Spitzers investigations revealed that	埃利奥特·斯皮策调查结果显示
[19:04]	the investments banks had promoted internet companies	投资银行明知一些网络公司必将破产
[19:07]	they knew would fail	却依然推销其股票
[19:08]	Stock analysts were being paid	股票分析师的收入
[19:10]	based on how much business they brought in	与其所办理业务的多少挂钩
[19:13]	and what they said publicly	而他们在公开场合
[19:14]	was quite different from what they said privately	与私下所言大相径庭
[19:17]	Infospace given the highest possible rating	Infospace公司虽然有着最高评级
[19:20]	dismissed by the analysts as the “Piece of junk”	却被分析师们贬为”垃圾”
[19:23]	Excite — also highly rated	同属最高评级的Excite公司
[19:25]	called “Such a piece of crap”	则被称做”狗屎一坨”
[19:27]		埃利奥特·斯皮策 纽约州州长(2007-2008) 纽约州检察长(1999-2007)
[19:27]	The defence that was proffered	这些投资银行
[19:30]	by many of the investment banks	所给出的辩解之词
[19:34]	was not, you’re wrong, it was…	不是说”你说错了” 而是说
[19:37]	everybodies doing it and everybodies knew what’s going on	大家都这么做 大家都明白怎么回事
[19:40]	and therefore nobody should rely on this analysts anyway.	因此大家不应该信赖这些分析评级
[19:42]		对美林银行处以100万美元罚金 公司股票研究争端解决方案
[19:43]	In december 2002 ten investment banks	2002年12月 十家投资银行
[19:46]	settle the case for a total of $1.4 billion	以总计14亿美元了结此案
[19:49]	and promised to change their ways.	并承诺将改变运营方式
[19:52]	Scott Talbott is the chief lobbyist	斯科特·塔波特
[19:55]	for the Financial Services Roundtable	美国金融服务业圆桌组织首席说客
[19:57]	one of the most powerful groups in Washington	该组织位列华盛顿最高权力集团
[19:59]	which represents nearly all of the world’s	该组织代表了几乎所有
[20:01]	largest financial companies	世界顶级金融公司
[20:03]	Are you comfortable with the fact	你们的成员公司
[20:03]		斯科特·塔波特 美国金融服务业圆桌组织首席说客
[20:05]	that several of your member companies	从事大规模犯罪活动
[20:07]	have engaged in large scale criminal activity?	对此您能容忍吗
[20:11]	– You’ll have to be specific – Ok…	-你得说具体点 -好吧
[20:13]	And first of all criminal activity shouldn’t be accepted, period	但首先 犯罪行为绝对不能接受 毫无疑问
[20:25]	Since deregulation began	自放松管制以来
[20:27]	the world’s biggest financial firms	世界上最大的金融公司
[20:28]	have been caught laundering money,	被发现涉嫌洗钱
[20:30]	defrauding customers and cooking their books	欺诈顾客 做假账
[20:34]	again, and again, and again	一而再 再而三
[20:47]	Credit Suisse helped funnel money for Iran’s nuclear program	瑞信银行为伊朗核计划
[20:51]	and for the Aerospace Industries Organization of Iran	和航空航天工业组织提供资金
[20:53]	which built ballistic missiles	该组织专门制造弹道导弹
[20:55]	Any information that would identify it	只要有证据表明为伊朗资金
[20:57]	as Iranian would be removed	就会被清除
[21:00]	The bank was fined $536 million	该银行被处以五亿三千六百万美元的罚金
[21:03]	Citi bank helped funnel $1.5 million	花旗银行协助将一百五十万毒资
[21:05]	of drug money out of Mexico	转移至墨西哥境外
[21:07]	Did you comment that she should	你说过她应该
[21:09]	“Loose any documents connected with the account”	“别管和该账户有关的文件”吗
[21:13]	I said that in a kidding manner	我说开玩笑说的
[21:13]		阿尔伯特·米尚 花旗私人银行副总裁
[21:14]	it was at the early stages of this.	是在这个项目早期说的
[21:16]	I did not mean it seriously.	我并没有真想如此
[21:19]		房地美 会计欺诈 处以罚金一亿两千五百万
[21:20]	Between 1998 and 2003	1998年至2003年
[21:20]		房利美 会计欺诈 处以罚金4亿
[21:23]	Fannie Mae overstated its earnings	房利美将其收入
[21:25]	by more than $10 billion	夸大上百亿
[21:26]	This accounting standards are highly complex	该认定标准十分复杂
[21:29]	and required determinations over which experts often disagree.	还需作出专家存在异议的决断
[21:33]	CEO Franklin Raines	CEO弗兰克林·雷恩斯
[21:35]	who used to be President Clinton’s budget director	曾任克林顿总统的预算主管
[21:37]	recieved over $22 million and bonuses	收益超过两千两百万美元 外加奖金
[21:44]	When UBS was caught	瑞士银行被控
[21:45]		瑞士银行 欺诈 被处七亿八千万美元罚金
[21:46]	helping wealthy Americans evade taxes.	帮助美国富人逃税时
[21:49]	they refused to cooperate with US goverment	他们拒绝配合美国政府
[21:52]	Would you be willing to supply the names?	你愿意供出姓名吗
[21:54]	If there is a treaty framework…	要是有条约框架
[21:56]	No treaty framework,	没什么条约框架
[21:57]	you’ve agreed you participated in a fraud	你都已经承认参与欺诈了
[22:07]		以下银行协助安然隐瞒欺诈 花旗银行 摩根大通 美林银行
[22:11]	But while the company is faced an unprecedented fines	但当公司面临数额空前的罚金时
[22:14]	the investment firms do not have to admit any wrong doing	投资公司却不需承认任何过错
[22:17]	When you this large and you are dealing	一旦你的公司规模如此之大
[22:19]	with this many products and this many customers	有如此多的产品和这么多的顾客
[22:21]	mistakes happen	出错是难免的
[22:22]	The financial services industry	金融服务业
[22:23]	seems to have level of criminality that is,	对犯罪行为的判定标准
[22:27]	you know, somewhat distinctive.	似乎比较独特
[22:29]	When were the last time when	有的公司就很少出问题
[22:32]	CISCO or Intel or Google or Apple or IBM you know…	比如思科 英特尔 谷歌 苹果和IBM
[22:37]	I’m totaly agree with you about	高科技行业比金融业稳定
[22:38]	hightech versus financial services.	我完全同意你这个说法
[22:40]	But hightech is fundamentally creative business	但高新科技这个行业是从根本上创新
[22:44]	where value generation and income derives	当你确实发明了与众不同的新东西
[22:47]	when you actually create something new and different	便由此产生价值 获得收入
[22:50]	Begining at 1990s	自上世纪九十年代起
[22:52]	deregulation and advances in technology	放松管制加上科技进步
[22:55]	led to an explosion of complex financial products,	导致复合型金融产品大爆发
[22:57]	called derivatives.	称为衍生品
[22:59]	Economists and bankers	经济学家和银行家们
[23:01]	claimed they made markets safer.	声称衍生品稳定了市场
[23:03]	But instead they made them unstable.	但事实上正相反
[23:06]	Since the end of Cold War	冷战之后
[23:07]		沈联涛 中国银监会首席顾问
[23:08]	a lot of former physicists and mathematicians	大批曾经的物理学家以及数学家
[23:12]	decided to apply their skills	决定将其技能
[23:14]	not on Cold War technology	应用于金融市场
[23:17]	but on financial markets.	而非冷战科技
[23:19]	And together with investment bankers and hedge funds…	这中间还包括投资银行家和对冲基金
[23:22]	– Create a different weapons? – Absolutely.	-造出了另一种武器 -没错
[23:24]	As Warren Buffett said:	正如沃伦·巴菲特所说
[23:25]	“Weapons of mass destruction”	“大规模杀伤性武器”
[23:27]		罗闻全 麻省理工金融工程实验室教授&负责人
[23:27]	Regulators, politicians and business people	市场监控者 政客和商界人士
[23:31]	did not take seriously	没有认真对待
[23:32]	the threat of financial innovation	金融创新对金融体系的稳定性
[23:35]	on the stability of the financial system.	所带来的威胁
[23:38]	Using derivatives	通过衍生品交易
[23:39]	bankers could gamble on virtually anything.	银行家可以对任何东西下注
[23:42]	They could bet on the rise or fall of oil prises	可以是油价涨跌
[23:45]	the bankruptcy of the company, even the weather.	公司是否破产 甚至包括天气
[23:49]	By the late 1990s	到上世纪九十年代末
[23:50]	derivatives were a $15 trillion unregulated market.	衍生品这个自由化市场资本已达十五万亿美元
[23:56]	In 1998 someone tried to regulate them.	1998年 有人试图监管这个市场
[24:00]	Brooksley Born graduated first in her class	布鲁克斯利·波恩以班级第一
[24:03]	in Stanford Law School	毕业于斯坦福法学院
[24:05]	and was the first woman to edit the major law review.	是首位主流法律评论女性编辑
[24:09]	After running derivatives practice at Arnold & Porter,	她曾在阿诺德-波特律所负责衍生品业务 此后
[24:11]	Born was appointed by president Clinton	克林顿总统任命波恩
[24:14]	to chair the Commodity Futures Trading Commission,	为美国商品期货交易委员会(CFTC)主席
[24:16]	which oversaw the derivatives’ market.	该机构负责监管衍生品市场
[24:19]	Brooksley Born ask me if	布鲁克斯利·波恩问我
[24:22]	I would come work with her.	是否愿意与她共事
[24:24]	We decided that this was a serious,	我们认定这个市场
[24:24]		麦克尔·格林伯格 美国商品期货交易委员会 前任副会长(1997-2000)
[24:27]	potentially destabilizing market.	具有相当的潜在不稳定性
[24:31]	In may of 1998 the CFTC issued a proposal to regulate derivatives.	1998年5月 CFTC发布提案意图监管衍生品
[24:36]	Clinton Treasury department had an immediate response.	克林顿政府财政部迅速做出回应
[24:40]	I happened to go into Brooksley’s office	我碰巧去了布鲁克斯利的办公室
[24:45]	and she was just putting down a reciever on her telephone.	她当时正放下电话听筒
[24:49]	And the blood had drained from her face	脸上血色全无
[24:53]	And she looked at me and said:	然后她看着我说
[24:55]	“That was Larry Summers.	“是拉里·萨默斯的电话
[24:56]	He had 13 bankers in his office”	他办公室里坐着十三个银行家”
[25:00]	He conveyed it in a very bullying fashion,	他的表述方式非常强硬
[25:04]	sort of directing her to stop.	有点勒令她停手的意思
[25:07]	The banks were now heavily reliant	政府现在过分依赖银行
[25:07]		萨蒂亚吉特·达斯 衍生品顾问 《交易员,枪和钞票》的作者
[25:09]	for earnings on this types of activities	通过此类衍生业务来赚钱收益
[25:11]	and that led to titanic battle	由此引出一场大规模战役
[25:14]	to prevent this set of instruments from been regulated.	以阻止此类收益手段被监管
[25:18]	Shortly after the phone call from Summers,	萨默斯来电后不久
[25:20]	Greenspan, Rubin and SEC chairman Arthur Levitt	格林斯潘 鲁宾和证监会主席亚瑟·莱维特
[25:25]	issued a joint statement condemning Born	发布联合声明 谴责波恩
[25:27]	and recomended legislation	并建议立法系统
[25:29]	to keep derivatives unregulated.	保障衍生品市场自由化
[25:32]	Regulations of derivatives transactions	对衍生品市场
[25:35]	that are privately negotiated by professionals	这种业内人士私下商议的产品市场进行监管
[25:39]	is unnecessary.	并无必要
[25:41]	She was overruled, unfortunately	很不幸 她的提案被驳回了
[25:41]		众议员巴尼·弗兰克 (民主党-马萨诸塞州) 众议院金融服务委员会主席
[25:43]	first by the Clinton administration	先是被克林顿政府驳回
[25:45]	and then by the Congress	而后在国会也是如此
[25:47]	in 2000 Senator phil Gramm took a major role	2000年 参议员菲尔·格兰姆作为核心人物
[25:50]	and getting a bill passed	让议案通过
[25:51]	that pretty much exempted derivatives from regulation.	使得衍生品在很大程度上免于监管
[25:55]	They are unifying markets they are reducing regulatory burden.	他们是在统一市场 减少管理负担
[25:55]		参议员菲尔·格兰姆(共和党-德克萨斯州) 参议院银行委员会主席
[25:58]	I believe that we need to do it.	我相信这正是我们该做的
[26:01]		离开参议院后 菲尔·格兰姆成为瑞士银行的副董事长
[26:04]		他的妻子温迪自1993年起 便供职于安然公司董事会
[26:08]	But its our very great hope	我们深切希望
[26:10]		拉里·萨默斯 财政部长(1992-2001)
[26:11]	that it would be possible to	有可能的话
[26:13]	move this year on legislation in a suitable way,	今年在立法上能有适当的发展
[26:17]	goes to create legal certainty for OTC derivatives.	使得场外衍生品在法律上具有确定性
[26:25]		此后 拉里·萨默斯以两千万身价 受雇于一家对冲基金担任顾问 该基金严重依赖衍生品
[26:30]	I wished to assosiate myself	我想说的是
[26:32]		艾伦·格林斯潘 美联储主席
[26:32]	with all of the remarks of secretary Summers.	我同意萨默斯部长的每一句话
[26:37]	In December 2000 Congress passed	2000年12月 国会通过
[26:39]	The Commodity Futures Modernization Act.	商品期货现代化法案
[26:42]	Written with a help of financial industry lobbyists,	这项法案在金融说客的协助下撰写而成
[26:45]	it banned the regulation of derivatives.	禁止了衍生品监管
[26:49]	Once that was done it was off to the races.	法案一经通过立即投入实施
[26:50]		弗兰克·帕特诺伊 加州大学圣地亚哥分校 法律与金融教授
[26:52]	And use of derivatives and financial innovation	衍生品以及金融创新的应用
[26:56]	exploded dramatically after 2000.	在2000年后出现大井喷
[26:59]	-So help me God -So help me God	-愿上帝保佑我 -愿上帝保佑我
[27:02]	By the time G.W. Bush took office in 2001,	到2001年乔治·W·布什就任时
[27:05]	the US financial sector was vastly more profitable,	美国金融业盈利性高涨
[27:08]	concentrated and powerfull then ever before.	分布集中 权力强大 大大超出以往
[27:13]	Dominating this industry were 5 investment banks,	主导这个行业的是五家投资银行
[27:13]		高盛 摩根史坦利 雷曼兄弟 美林证券公司 贝尔斯登
[27:16]		花旗集团 摩根大通
[27:16]	two financial conglomerates,	两家金融集团
[27:18]		美国国际集团 美国城市债券保险 安巴克金融集团
[27:19]	three securities insurance companies,	三家证券保险公司
[27:21]		穆迪公司 标准普尔 惠誉
[27:22]	and three rating agencies.	三家信用等级评价机构
[27:25]	And linking them all together	而链接它们的是
[27:26]	was a securitization food chain, a new system,	一条证券化的食物链 一个全新体系
[27:30]	which connected trillion of dollars, mortgages and other loans	将上万亿美元 抵押贷款及其他贷款
[27:33]	with investors all over the world.	与全世界投资者相关联
[27:36]	30 years ago if you wanted get a loan for a home,	三十年前 想要贷款买房
[27:38]		众议员巴尼·弗兰克(民主党-马萨诸塞州) 众议院金融服务委员会主席
[27:39]	the person lending you a money	借给你这笔钱的人
[27:40]	expecting you to pay him or her back.	指望你能把钱还回去
[27:43]	You got a loan from a lender who wanted you to pay him back.	你从放贷人那里贷款 而他希望你能偿还
[27:45]	We’ve since developed securitization whereby	因此发展出资产证券化
[27:48]	people who made the loan	这样一来 放贷人
[27:50]	are no loger at risk of the failure of repay.	便不会再有借款无法收回的风险
[27:53]	In old system when home owner paid their mortgage every months	在旧的体系中 业主按月付按揭
[27:57]	the money went to their local lender.	钱直接返还给放贷人
[28:00]	And since mortgages took decades to repay	鉴于按揭付款需要几十年才能付清
[28:02]	lenders were carefull.	因此放贷人很谨慎
[28:04]	In a new system lenders sold the mortgages to investment banks.	在新的体系中 贷方将按揭贷款出售给投行
[28:09]	The investment banks	投资银行
[28:10]	combined thousands of mortgages and other loans,	将成千上万的按揭以及其他贷款
[28:13]	including car loans,	包括汽车贷款
[28:14]	student loans and credit card debt	助学贷款及信用卡债务
[28:17]	to create complex derivatives	组合成复合型衍生品
[28:19]	called collateralized debt obligation, or CDO.	称为债务抵押证券 或CDO
[28:24]	The investment banks then sold the CDOs to investors.	接下来 投行将这些CDO出售给投资者
[28:29]	Now when home owners pay their mortgages,	这样一来 当购房者支付按揭时
[28:31]	the money went to investors all over the world.	这笔钱流向世界各地的投资者
[28:34]	The investment banks paid rating agencies	投行付钱请信用等级评定机构
[28:37]	to evaluate the CDOs	对CDO进行估值
[28:38]	AAA	信用等级评价机构
[28:39]	and many of them were given a AAA rating,	其中很多都获评AAA等级
[28:41]	AAA BBB	信用等级评价机构
[28:42]	which is highest possible investment rate.	即投资等级中的最高级别
[28:45]	This made CDOs popular with retirement funds	这就使得CDO很受退休基金的欢迎
[28:45]	AAA BBB	信用等级评价机构 BB(垃圾)
[28:48]	which can only purchase highly rated securities.	因其只能购买信用等级高的证券
[28:52]	This system was a ticking time bomb.	这一体系无异于定时炸弹
[28:56]	Lenders didn’t care anymore about whether a borrower can repay.	贷方不再关心借款人是否有能力偿还
[29:00]	So they started making riskier loans.	于是他们开始放出更高风险贷款
[29:00]		按揭贷款 良好信用 不良信用 各种情况 预先批准
[29:02]	The investment banks didn’t care either.	投行对偿还能力也不关心
[29:05]	The more CDOs they sold the higher their profits.	CDO卖得越多 他们的利润就越高
[29:09]	And the rating agencies which were paid by the investment banks	而接受投行佣金的信用评级机构
[29:14]	had no liability if their ratings of CDOs proved wrong.	若在评级中出现失误 也无任何责任
[29:16]		取消回赎 零首付
[29:18]	You were getting to be on the hook	你将被套在其中
[29:20]		吉莲·邰蒂 《金融时报》美国版总编辑
[29:20]	and there weren’t regulationly constraints.	而且也不存在监管限制
[29:23]	So there were a green light to just pump out more and more loans..,	这就为越来越多的贷款开了绿灯
[29:26]	Bentween 2000 and 2003,	在2000到2003年间
[29:26]		按揭贷款 (单位: 十亿)
[29:30]	the number of mortgage loans made each year	每年按揭贷款总额
[29:32]	nearly quadrupled.	几乎翻了四番
[29:35]	Everybody in this securitization food chain	这个证券化食物链上的所有人
[29:38]	from the very beggining until the end	从一开始到最后
[29:40]	didn’t care about quality of the mortgage.	都不在意按揭贷款质量
[29:43]	They caring about maximazing their volume	他们在意的是将贷款总量最大化
[29:45]	and getting a fee out of it.	然后从中抽取酬金
[29:48]		次级贷款 (占所有贷款比例)
[29:48]	In the early 2000s there was a huge increase in the riskiest loans	二十一世纪初 一种风险最大的贷款大幅增多
[29:52]	called subprime.	即次级贷款
[29:54]	But when thousands of subprime loans	但当成千上万的次级贷款
[29:56]	were combined to create CDOs,	被合并在一起做成CDO时
[29:59]	many of them still received AAA ratings.	其中许多仍然得到了AAA评级
[30:04]	Now it wouldn’t have been possible to create derivative products	原本可以创造出与如今这种同等免赔额
[30:05]		吉莲·邰蒂 《金融时报》美国版总编辑
[30:09]	that don’t have this risks that carry the equivalent of deductibles,	但不具这种风险的金融衍生产品
[30:14]	where there are limits on risks	其风险程度有上限
[30:17]	that can be taken on and so forth.	在承受范围之内 等等之类
[30:19]	They didn’t do that, did they?	可他们并没这么做 对不对
[30:21]	They didn’t do that and	他们没有
[30:22]	in retrospect they should have done.	而且现在看来 他们应该这么做的
[30:24]	So these guys knew they were doing something dangerous?	也就是说 他们知道自己的行为很危险?
[30:27]	I think they did.	我认为是这样
[30:28]		投行更倾心于次级贷款 因为可以获得更高的利息
[30:39]		借款人被无辜牵扯进高额次级贷款 许多人拿到贷款 而他们根本无力偿还
[30:46]	All incentives that the financial institutions	金融机构给按揭经纪人
[30:46]		罗伯特·那兹达 格林宁研究所前所长
[30:49]	offered to the mortgage brokers	提供的刺激奖励
[30:51]	were based on sawing the most profitable products	是建立在瓜分这种最高盈利性产品的基础之上
[30:54]	which were predatory loans	也就是掠夺性贷款
[30:57]	The bankers makes more money	说服你申请次级贷款
[30:57]		埃里克·霍珀林 责任贷款中心华盛顿办公室主任
[30:57]	if they put you on subprime loan	银行家能因此赚更多的钱
[30:59]	That’s what they gonna put you	他们就会这么对付你
[31:01]	(2001-2007)	第二部分: 泡沫
[31:07]	Suddenly hundreds of billions of dollars a year	突然之间 每年有上千亿美元
[31:10]	were flowing through securitization chain	在证券链中流动
[31:13]	Since anyone can get a mortgage	因为任何人都能申请按揭
[31:15]	home purchases and house’s prices skyrocketed	房屋交易量和放假飙升
[31:18]	The result was the biggest financial bubble in history	造成的结果就是 形成史上最大金融泡沫
[31:22]	Real estate is real, they can see their asset	房地产是实实在在的 看得见摸得着
[31:26]	their can live in their asset, they can rent out their asset	可以自己住 也可以对外出租
[31:29]		查尔斯·莫里斯 《两万亿的消融》作者
[31:29]	You had huge boom in housing that had no sense at all	房地产业大井喷 但其毫无意义
[31:33]	The financing appetites of financial sector	金融业的金融偏好
[31:39]	drove what everyboby else did	控制着其他各方的一举一动
[31:42]	Last time we had a housing bubble was in the late 80s	上一次出现房地产泡沫是在八十年代后期
[31:46]	In that case the increasing home praises	相较而言 那一次的房价上涨
[31:49]	were relatively minor	幅度很小
[31:52]	That housing bubble led to relatively severe recession	那次房地产泡沫导致了较为严重的经济衰退
[31:57]	From 1996 until 2006 real home prices effectively doubled	1996年到2006年间 房价翻了一番
[32:09]	At $500 a ticket	以五百美元票价
[32:10]	they come to hear how buy	人们聚集于此聆听
[32:12]	their very own piece of American dream	如何买进自己的美国梦
[32:16]	Goldman Sachs, Bear Stearns,	高盛 贝尔斯登
[32:16]		罗伯特·那兹达 格林宁研究所所长
[32:18]	Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch	雷曼兄弟 美林
[32:21]	were all in on this	都参与其中
[32:22]	The subprime lending alone	仅仅次级贷款这一项
[32:26]	increase from $30 billion a year in funding	十年间 资金从每年三百亿美元
[32:29]	to over six hundred billion a year in ten years	上涨到每年六千亿美元
[32:33]	they new what was happening	情况如何 他们心里明白
[32:35]	Countrywide Financial – the largest subprime lender	美国国家金融服务公司 最大的次贷出贷方
[32:37]		排名 1 国家金融服务公司
[32:38]	issued $97 billion worth of loans	发行了价值970亿的贷款
[32:43]		国家金融服务公司利润 (单位: 十亿)
[32:43]	It made over %11 million dollars in profits as a result	最终收益达一千一百亿
[32:47]		华尔街奖金 (单位: 十亿)
[32:47]	On Wall Street annual cash bonuses spiked	在华尔街 年终现金奖励飙升
[32:52]	traders and CEOs became enormously wealthy during the bubble	各位交易员和CEO 在泡沫中暴富
[32:56]	Lehman Brothers was the top underwriter of subprime lending	雷曼兄弟是次级贷款的首要承销商
[33:00]	And their CEO Richard Fuld	其CEO理查德·福尔德
[33:02]	took home $485 million	收获了四亿八千五百万美元
[33:07]	On Wall Street this housing and credit bubble	此次房地产以及信用泡沫
[33:07]		鲁里埃尔·鲁比尼 纽约大学商学院教授
[33:10]	was leading to hundreds of billions of dollars of profits	为华尔街带来了上千亿的利润
[33:13]	By 2006 about 40% of all profits of S&P 500 firms	到2006年 标准普尔500公司全部利润的40%
[33:19]	was coming from financial institutions	都是来源于金融机构
[33:21]	It wasn’t real profits, it wasn’t real income	那不是真实利润 不是真实收入
[33:21]		马丁·沃尔夫 《金融时报》首席经济评论员
[33:24]	It was just money that was been	不过是体系臆造出的钱
[33:26]	created by the system and booked as income	然后将其定义为收入
[33:29]	2 3 years down the road	两三年之后
[33:30]	this is a default it’s all wiped out	就会成为拖欠额 然后一笔勾销
[33:33]	I think it was in fact, in retrospect, a great big national,	我认为从现在看来 这是一场大规模全国性
[33:37]	and not just national global ponzi scheme	不仅是全国性 是全球性的旁氏骗局
[33:40]	Through the home ownership and equity protection act	通过住房所有权和权益保护法案
[33:43]	the Federal Reserve Board had brought authority	美国联邦储备委员会向按揭贷款产业
[33:46]	to regulate mortgage industry	引入权力机构进行监管
[33:49]	but Federal Chairman Alan Greenspan refuse to use it	但美联储主席格林斯潘无意使用该法案
[33:52]	Alan Greenspan said: “No,	格林斯潘说”不行
[33:53]	that regulation, I don’t even believe in it”	我根本就不信任那个法案”
[33:57]	For 20 years	二十多年内
[33:57]	Robert Gnaizda was the head of Greenlining	罗伯特·那兹达一直是格林宁研究所
[34:00]	a powerfull consumer advocacy group	这个消费者权益协会的领袖
[34:03]	He met with Greenspan on a regular basis	他定期会见格林斯潘
[34:06]	We gave him an example of Countrywide	我们向他提供了国家金融公司
[34:07]		罗伯特·那兹达 格林宁研究所所长
[34:08]	150 different complex adjustable rate mortgages	一百五十份不同的可调利率复杂贷款范例
[34:14]	He said if you’d had a doctorate in math	他说 就算你有数学博士学位
[34:17]	you wouldn’t be able to understand them enough	也不能对其完全理解
[34:19]	to know which was good for you and which wasn’t	判断出哪些对你有益哪些无益
[34:23]	So we thought he was gonna take action	所以我们以为他会采取措施
[34:26]	but as the conversation continues	然而随着谈话深入
[34:29]	it was clear he was stuck with his ideology	就发现 很明显他还是坚持自己的想法
[34:31]	We met again with Greenspan at ’05	零五年我们又见到了他
[34:34]	often we met with him twice a year never less than once a year	通常我们一年见他两次 至少每年一次
[34:39]	and he wouldn’t change his mind	他还是不肯改变想法
[34:46]	In this amazing world of instant globalization,	当今世界全球化迅猛发展 令人称奇
[34:46]		克里斯多佛·考克斯 美国证监会主席
[34:50]	The free and efficient movement of capital	高效自由的资本流动
[34:52]	is helping to create the greatest prosperity in human history	正协助制造出人类历史上的鼎盛时期
[34:56]		美国证券交易监督委员会在房产泡沫期 从未对投资银行进行重点调查
[35:02]	146 people were cut	共有146人
[35:03]	from the enforcement division of SEC	被证监会执法部裁员
[35:06]	-Is that what you testified to? -Yes.	-你是来为此作证的吗 -是的
[35:09]		林恩·E·特纳 证监会前首席会计
[35:10]	Yeah, I think there has been a, a systematic	我想这是对部门及其承载力
[35:15]	gutting, or whatever you want to call it,	进行内部清理
[35:17]	of the agency and its capability,	或者你有别的说法
[35:20]	through cutting back of staff.	清理手段就是裁员
[35:22]	The SEC office of risk managment	证监会风险管理办公室
[35:24]	was reduce to stuff,	裁到最后只剩
[35:26]	did you say, of 1?	一个人 你是这意思吗
[35:29]	Year, when that gentelman would	是的 这位先生傍晚下班后
[35:31]	go home at night he could turn the lights out.	就可以把办公室灯关掉了
[35:35]	During the bubble the investment banks were borrowing heavily	在泡沫期 投行大量借款
[35:38]	to buy more loans and create more CDOs	以买入更多贷款 制成更多的CDO
[35:42]	The ratio between borrowed money and	借款与银行资产之比
[35:44]		借款 银行资产
[35:45]	bank’s own money was called leverage	称为举债经营比率
[35:48]	The more banks borrowed the higher their leverage	银行借款越多 举债经营比率越高
[35:53]	In 2004 henry Paulson the CEO of Goldman Sachs	2004年 高盛CEO亨利·保尔森
[35:58]	helped lobby the Securities and Exchange Commission	帮助游说证券交易监督委员会
[36:01]	to relax limits on leverage	放宽对举债经营比率的限制
[36:03]	allowing the banks to sharply increase their borrowing	允许银行大幅增加其借款数额
[36:07]		肯尼斯·罗格夫 哈佛大学经济学教授
[36:07]	The SEC somehow decided to let	证监会不知作何考虑
[36:10]	investment banks gamble a lot more	允许投行加大赌注
[36:13]	That was nuts	简直疯了
[36:14]	I don’t know why they did that but they did that	不明白他们为何要这样 但他们就这么办了
[36:17]		2004年4月28日 证监会委员召开会议 考虑解除针对投行的举债经营比率限制
[36:23]	We’ve said these are the big guys and clearly that’s true.	我们说过这些都是大公司 这显然没错
[36:24]		委员会成员 哈维·J·戈斯克米德
[36:26]	But that means if anything goes wrong,	可这意味着 一旦有任何差错
[36:29]	it’s going to be an awfully big mess.	就会引发大混乱
[36:33]	At this levels you’re obviously dealing	事情到这里 很显然
[36:33]		总监 安妮特·L·纳萨特
[36:35]	with the most highly sophisticated financial institutions	你所面对的是最顶级的金融机构
[36:39]	These are the firms that do most	这几个公司
[36:39]		委员会成员 罗·C·堪布斯
[36:40]	of the derivative activity in the United States.	运作了全美几乎所有的衍生品业务
[36:43]	We talked to some of them as to	我们和其中几个公司
[36:44]	what their comfort level was.	就其心理上限谈过
[36:46]	The firms actually thought that the number was appropriate.	他们真的觉得当时数额很合适
[36:47]		总监 安妮特·L·纳萨特
[36:52]	Do the commissioners vote to adopt the	委员会成员是否听取员工建议
[36:52]		主席 威廉·唐纳森
[36:53]	rule amendments and new rules as recommended by the staff?	投票决意采用规则修正案和新规则
[36:57]	We do indeed. Anonymous.	没错 匿名投票
[36:59]	And we are adjourned.	然后一直押后到现在
[37:04]	The degree of leverage in financial system	金融体系的举债经营比
[37:08]	became absolutely frightening	已经变得很吓人了
[37:10]		丹尼尔·阿尔珀特 威斯伍德资本公司 执行董事
[37:10]	investment banks leveraging up to the level 33 to 1	投行的举债经营比已上升至33比1
[37:15]	which means that tiny 3 procent decrease in a value of asset base	也就是说资产基础只要下降区区3%
[37:19]	would leave them insolvent.	他们就会无力偿还债务
[37:24]	There was another ticking time bomb in the financial system	金融体系里还有另一个定时炸弹
[37:27]	AIG – the worlds largest insurence company	AIG 全球最大的保险公司
[37:31]	was selling huge quantities of derivatives	销售了大量衍生品
[37:33]	called credit default swaps	即信用违约互换
[37:37]	For investers who owned CDOs	对于持有CDO的投资者来说
[37:39]	credit default swaps worked like an insurance policy	信用违约互换就像一张保险单
[37:43]	An investor who purchase credit default swap	购买信用违约互换的投资者
[37:45]	paid AIG accordingly premium	按期付款给AIG公司
[37:48]	If CDO went bad	一旦CDO出现问题
[37:51]	AIG promised to pay to investor for their losses	AIG承诺赔偿投资者损失
[37:56]	But unlike regular insurance	但与常规保险不同
[37:58]	speculators could also buy credit default swaps from AIG	投机者也可以从AIG公司购买信用违约互换
[38:02]	in order to bet against CDOs they didn’t own	以便对不属于自己的CDO下注
[38:06]	In insurence you could only insure something you own	在保险业中 只能为自己拥有的东西投保
[38:09]	Let’s say you and I own property	比如说 你我拥有资产
[38:09]		萨蒂亚吉特·达斯 衍生品顾问 《交易员,枪和钞票》的作者
[38:11]	and I own a house	我拥有一幢房屋
[38:12]	I can only insure that house once	我只能对该房屋投保一次
[38:15]	the derivatives universe essentially enables	而衍生品实质上使得每个人
[38:17]	anybody to actually insure that house	都可以为该房屋投保
[38:21]	So you could insure that somebody else could do that	所以你可以对其投保 其他人也可以
[38:23]	so 50 people could insure my house	有五十个人可以为我的房屋投保
[38:25]	So what happens is if my house burns down	情况是这样 一旦我的房屋烧毁
[38:29]	the number of losses in the system becomes proportionally large	体系中的损失也相应变得很大
[38:32]	Since credit default swaps were unregulated	因为信用违约互换并不受监管
[38:35]	AIG didn’t have put aside any money to cover potential losses	AIG没有储备资金弥补潜在损失
[38:40]	Instead AIG paid its employees huge cash bonuses	相反 一旦签订合同
[38:44]	as soon as contract was signed	AIG便给员工发放大额奖金
[38:47]	but if a CDOs later went bad	而一旦CDO出现问题
[38:50]	AIG would be on the hook	AIG便会陷入泥潭
[38:52]	People were essentially been rewarded for taking massive risks.	本质上说 当时的机制鼓励人们冒巨大风险
[38:56]	In good times they generate short-term revenues	年成好的时候 会产生短期税收
[39:00]	and profits and therefore bonuses	利润 和由此而来的奖金
[39:02]	but that’s gonna lead to the firm to be bankrupt over time	当长此下去 会导致公司破产
[39:05]	that’s totally distorted system of compensation	这是一个完全扭曲的薪酬制度
[39:09]	AIG Financial Products division in Lonodon	AIG在伦敦的金融产品部
[39:11]	issued $500 billion	在泡沫期
[39:14]	worth of credit default swaps during the bubble,	发行了价值五千亿的信用违约互换
[39:17]	many of them for CDOs backed by subprime mortgages	其中许多是由次级贷支撑的CDO
[39:20]	The 400 employees of AIG FP	AIG金融产品部的四百名员工
[39:24]	made $3.5 billion between 2000 and 2007	在2000年到2007年间 共赚得35亿美元
[39:29]	Joseph Cassano	约瑟夫·卡萨诺
[39:30]	the head of AIG FP	AIG金融产品部主管
[39:32]	personally made $315 million	个人收入达三亿一千五百万
[39:35]	It’s hard for us, without being flippant，	这么说并非轻率
[39:39]	to even see a scenario within any kind of realm of reason	但理性看来 在这些交易中
[39:43]	that would see us losing $1 in any of those transactions	要损失一块钱都很难
[39:49]	In 2007 AIG auditors riaied warnings	2007年 AIG审计员提出警告
[39:54]	One of them Joseph St. Denis	约瑟夫·圣丹尼斯作为其中之一
[39:55]	resigned in protest	辞职以示抗议
[39:57]	After Cassano repeatedly	此前卡萨诺多次出面
[39:59]	blocked him from investigating AIG FP’s accounting	阻挠他调查AIG金融产品部会计记录
[40:03]	Let me tell you one person	我告诉你 有一个人
[40:03]		马丁·沙利文 AIG首席执行官(2005-2008)
[40:04]	who didn’t get a bonus when everybody else was getting bonuses	当大家都分得红利时 他一分钱没拿
[40:06]		亨利·韦克斯曼 众议院监管委员会主席
[40:07]	That was St Denis	那就是圣丹尼斯
[40:08]	Mr. St. Denis	圣丹尼斯先生
[40:10]	who tried to alert two of you	曾试图警告你们二位
[40:11]	to the fact that you are running into big problems	这样下去会惹上大麻烦
[40:14]	he quit in frustration and he didn’t get a bonus	他在精疲力竭后辞职 一分奖金未得
[40:18]	In 2005 Raghuram Rajan then the	2005年 拉古拉姆·瑞占
[40:20]	Chief economist of the International Monetary Fund	时任国际货币基金组织首席经济学家
[40:24]	delivered a paper at the Annual Jackson Hole symposium	在杰克逊霍尔年度研讨会
[40:27]	the most elite banking conference in the world	这一银行界顶尖会议上递交论文
[40:30]	Who was in the audience?	当时在场的有谁
[40:31]		拉古拉姆·瑞占 国际货币基金组织首席经济学家(2003-2007)
[40:32]	It was I guess a central bankers of the world	我想世界上最核心的银行家应该都在
[40:36]	ranging from Mr. Greenspan himself,	格林斯潘先生本人也在
[40:40]	Ben Bernanke,	本?伯南克
[40:42]	Larry Summers was there,	拉里·萨默斯在场
[40:43]	Tim Geithner was there	提姆·盖特纳也在场
[40:45]	The title of the paper was essentially	报告的标题很关键
[40:48]	Is Financial Development Making the World Riskier?	金融发展是否让世界愈加不稳定
[40:48]		金融发展是否让世界愈加不稳定 拉古拉姆·G·瑞占
[40:52]	and the conclusion was it is.	结论是肯定的
[40:56]	Rajan’s paper focused on	瑞占的论文
[40:58]	incentives structures that generated huge cash bonuses	聚焦于刺激奖励机制 其在短期利润基础上
[41:02]	based on short-term profits,	产生巨额现金奖金
[41:04]	but which imposed no penalties for later losses.	却不对对此后的损失处以任何罚金
[41:07]	Rajan argued that these	瑞占认为
[41:08]	incentives encouraged bankers to take risks	这种刺激奖励机制鼓励银行家去冒险
[41:11]	that might eventually destroy their own firms,	最终可能会摧毁其自己的公司
[41:14]	or even the entire financial system.	甚至摧毁整个金融体系
[41:20]	It’s very easy to generate perfomance by taking on more risk.	承担更大的风险可以轻松产生绩效
[41:23]		拉古拉姆·瑞占 国际货币基金组织首席经济学家(2003-2007)
[41:25]	And so what you need to do	所以你提供薪酬
[41:26]	is compensate for risk-adjusted performance,	应该根据风险调整后的绩效
[41:29]	and that’s where all the bodies are buried.	这才是真正的绩效
[41:32]	Rajan, you know, hit the nail on the head.	瑞占可以说是一针见血
[41:32]		肯尼斯·罗格夫 哈佛大学经济学教授
[41:35]	What he particularly said was:	他尤其说道
[41:37]	“You guys have claimed you found a way	“你们口口声声说自己找到了
[41:39]	to make more profit with less risk,	低风险高利润的赚钱途径
[41:43]	I say you found a way to make a more profit with more risk”	要我说 这一途径是高风险高利润”
[41:46]	And there’s a big difference.	两者相去甚远
[41:47]	Summers was vocal.	萨默斯说话很直接
[41:50]	He basically thought that	他基本上是这么认为
[41:52]	I was criticizing the change in the financial world.	我是在批判金融界变革
[41:58]	And was worried about regulation,	担忧监管问题
[42:01]	which reverse this whole change.	这种会逆转变革的东西
[42:04]	So essentially he accused me of being a Luddite.	所以实际上 他就是指责我为勒德分子
[42:06]	He wanted to make sure that	他不希望
[42:09]	we didn’t bring a whole new set of regulations	我们搞出一套新的监管制度
[42:13]	to constrain the financial sector at that point.	在那种情形下制约金融业
[42:20]	You gonna make an extra $2 million dollars a year	你可以每年多赚两百万美元
[42:20]		弗兰克·帕特诺伊 加州大学圣地亚哥分校 法律与金融教授
[42:22]	or $10 million dollars a year	或一千万美元
[42:24]	for puting you financial institution at risk.	只要你敢拿你的金融机构冒险
[42:26]	Someone else pays the bill – you don’t pay the bill.	会有别人为此买单 与你无关
[42:29]	Would you make that bet?	你愿意赌一把吗
[42:30]	Most people who worked on Wall Street said:	大多数在华尔街工作的人都说
[42:32]	“Sure, I make that bet”.	“当然愿意 我赌一把”
[43:00]		汉普顿 距离纽约两小时路程
[43:17]	That’s never was enough.	他们欲求不满
[43:19]	They never wanna own one home.	他们不想只有一处房子
[43:21]	They wanna own five homes	他们想要坐拥五处房产
[43:22]	and they wanna have an expensive Penthouse on Park Avenue.	想拥有一套林荫大道上的高价顶层公寓
[43:28]	And they want have they own private jet.	还想拥有私人飞机
[43:31]	You think this is an industry where high,	您认为在这个行业 高额薪酬
[43:31]		斯科特·塔波特 美国金融服务业圆桌组织首席说客
[43:33]	very high compensation levels is just fine?	如此高额的薪酬没问题吗
[43:36]	I think I would take caution, take heed,	对于你所说的”高额”
[43:38]	or take exception at your word very high,	我持谨慎态度 不同意这一说法
[43:41]	I mean it’s all relative.	数额大小都是相对的
[43:42]	You have a $40 million oceanfront home in Florida,	你在佛罗里达拥有四千亿美元的滨海住宅
[43:45]	you have a summer vacation home in Sun Valley, Idaho.	在爱达荷的太阳谷拥有一处避暑住宅
[43:47]		理查德·福尔德 雷曼兄弟公司CEO
[43:48]	You and your wife have art collection	你们夫妻的艺术收藏品中
[43:50]	filled with million dollar paintings.	充斥着价值百万的画
[43:51]	Richard Fuld never appeared on the trading floor.	理查德·福尔德从来不去交易所
[43:54]	There was art advisors up there all the time.	一直都是跟艺术顾问在一起
[43:57]	You know, he had his own private elevator,	他还有自己的私人电梯
[43:57]		劳伦斯·麦克唐纳德 雷曼兄弟公司前任副总裁
[43:58]	he was out of his way to be disconnected.	他使劲浑身解数 就为寻个清静
[44:01]	I mean, his elevator,	要知道 他的电梯
[44:02]	they hire technicians to program it, you know,	也是请来技术员设定好
[44:05]	so that his driver would call in in the morning,	这样他的司机早上打电话过来
[44:07]	and a security guard would hold it.	就会有保安按下电梯等他
[44:09]	And there’a only like 2 or 3 seconds window	这中间大概只会空出两三秒时间
[44:11]	when he actually he has to see people,	可能让他被人看到
[44:15]	and he hops in the elevator and he goes straight to 31.	然后就进入电梯 直达三十一层
[44:18]	Lehman owned a bunch of corporate jets,	雷曼公司有很多架商务机
[44:18]		哈维·米勒 雷曼公司破产程序律师
[44:20]	– do you know about this? – Yes.	-你知道吗 -知道
[44:22]	How many were there?	有多少架
[44:24]	Well, there were 6, including 767s.	有六架 包括几架波音767
[44:27]	They also had a helicopter.	他们还有一架直升机
[44:28]	I see. Isn’t that kind a lot of planes to have?	知道了 这么多飞机不嫌多吗
[44:34]	We deal with type A personalities,	我们同A型人格者打交道
[44:34]		杰弗瑞·莱恩 雷曼兄弟公司 副董事长(2003-2007)
[44:35]	and type A personalities know everything in the world.	他们对整个世界了如指掌
[44:38]	Banking became a pissing contest, you know	银行业变成了一场无聊的竞赛
[44:39]		威勒姆·布特 花旗集团首席经济学家
[44:41]	mine is bigger than yours, that’s kind of stuff.	单纯的规模 数量上的竞赛
[44:43]	It was all men that ran it, incidentally.	而且是所有人都参与
[44:45]	$15 billions deals weren’t	一百五十亿的生意
[44:47]	large enough so we do $100 billion deals.	还是不够大 得做上千亿的生意
[44:50]	These people are risk-takers, they’re impulsive.	那些人乐于冒险 浮躁冲动
[44:52]		乔纳森·阿尔珀特是一位心理治疗师 他的客户中包括许多华尔街高管
[44:58]	That’s part of their behavior,	这是他们行为的一部分
[44:59]	part of their personality	也是他们人格的一部分
[45:01]	and that manifests outside of work as well.	在工作之余仍显露无遗
[45:04]	It’s quite typical for the guys	他们的典型行为包括
[45:06]		闪电舞娘 男性俱乐部 寿司&清酒吧
[45:07]	to go out, to go strip bars, to use drugs.	出门去脱衣舞俱乐部 滥用毒品
[45:09]	I see a lot of cocain use, a lot of use of prostitution.	我知道他们大量吸食可卡因 频繁招妓
[45:12]		《纽约时报》 华尔街头繁华尽 千金膝舞犹春宵
[45:14]		据切尔西一家贵宾俱乐部老板估计 其80%客人来自于华尔街
[45:19]	Recently neuroscientists have done experiments	最近神经学家进行了一项实验
[45:19]		罗闻全 MIT金融工程实验室教授&负责人
[45:21]	where they’ve taken individuals	他们将实验对象
[45:25]	put them into MRI machine and	置于核磁共振仪监测下
[45:27]	and they have them play game where the prize is money.	让他们玩以金钱作为奖赏的游戏
[45:32]	And they notice that when the subjects earn money	他们注意到 当实验对象赢钱时
[45:35]	the part of the brain that get stimulated	他们大脑中受刺激部位
[45:37]	is the same part that cocain stimulates.	和服用可卡因时受刺激部位是一样的
[45:40]	A lot of people feel they need to really participate in that behavior	很多人认为他们必须参与到这种行为当中
[45:44]	to make it to get promoted, to get recognized.	才能得到晋升 被人认同
[45:46]	According to a Bloomberg article	根据一篇彭博社的文章所说
[45:48]	business entertainment represents	商务应酬的花费
[45:49]	5% of revenue for New York derivatives brokers.	占到纽约衍生品经纪人收入的5%
[45:53]	and often includes strip clubs, prostitution, and drugs.	其中常包括脱衣舞吧 嫖娼和毒品的消费
[45:58]	A New York broker filed a lawsuit in 2007 against his firm	2007年 一位纽约经纪人对其公司提起诉讼
[46:02]	alleging he was required to retain prostitutes to entertain traders.	声称自己要花钱雇娼妓取悦交易人
[46:07]	There’s just a blatant disregard	这种行为
[46:09]	for the impact that their actions might have on,	可能对社会和家庭产生的影响
[46:11]	on society, on family	他们完全不以为意
[46:14]	They have no problem using a prostitute,	他们可以召妓
[46:17]	uh, and going home to their wife.	然后回家见妻子 毫不羞耻
[46:22]		克莉丝汀·戴维斯在其高级寓所里 经营一家高端卖淫集团
[46:28]	How many customers?	你有多少客人
[46:30]	About 10,000 at that point in time.	那时候大概有一万多人
[46:38]	What fraction were from Wall Street?	有几成是来自华尔街的
[46:40]	Of the higher-end clients, probably. 40 to 50 percent.	就高端客户 大概百分之四十到五十
[46:44]	And were all the major wall Street firms represented?	所有华尔街大公司的人都有吗
[46:47]	Goldman Sachs.	比如高盛
[46:48]	Lehman Brothers, yeah, they’re all in there.	雷曼兄弟 对 都有
[46:51]	Morgan Stanley was a little less of that.	摩根士丹利这方面稍微好一点
[46:55]	Uh, I think Goldman was, was pretty, pretty big with that.	我认为高盛则在这方面比较严重
[46:59]	A lot of clients would call me,	很多客人会打电话给我说
[46:59]	and say, can you get me a Lamborghini for the night for the girl?	今晚能不能给我的女伴弄部兰博基尼
[47:03]	These guys were spending corporate money.	他们花的都是公司的钱
[47:05]	I had many black cards from,	我这有很多张黑卡[高级信用卡]
[47:08]	you know, the various financial firms.	都是各个金融公司的户头
[47:10]	What’s happening is	情况一般都是这样
[47:12]	services are being charged to computer repair.	把这些费用写为电脑维修
[47:16]	Trading research, you know, consulting for market compliance.	贸易研究 还有市场监督咨询之类的
[47:20]	I just usually gave them a piece of letterhead,	我经常直接把发票抬头留给他们
[47:22]	and said, make your own invoice.	然后让他们想报什么自己写
[47:23]	So this pattern of behavior, you think,	也就是说 你认为这种行为模式
[47:25]	extends to the senior management of the firm.	可以延伸到公司高管身上
[47:27]	Absolutely does, yeah. I know for a fact that it does.	当然可以 据我所知 确实如此
[47:31]	It extends to the very top.	一直延伸到最高层
[47:38]		艾伦·斯隆 《财富杂志》高级编辑
[47:38]	A friend of mine, who, who’s involved in a company	我一位朋友在一家公司工作
[47:40]	that has a big financial presence,	他们公司有大型金融业务
[47:41]	says, well, it’s about time you learned about subprime mortgages.	他说 你应该了解一下次级贷款了
[47:46]	So he set up a session with his trading desk and me	所以他就在交易柜前跟我普及知识
[47:50]	and, and a techie, who, who did all this,	当时还有一位做这方面的技术员在
[47:53]	gets very excited, runs to his computer,	他聊到兴头上 冲到电脑前
[47:55]	pulls up, in about three seconds,	大概过了三秒钟
[47:57]	this Goldman Sachs issue of securities.	就调出了高盛的证券投资记录
[48:00]	It was a complete disaster.	简直太可怕了
[48:02]	Borrowers had borrowed,	平均下算来
[48:04]	on average, 99.3 percent of the price of the house,	购房者99.3%的房款都是贷的
[48:08]	which means they have no money in the house.	说明他们根本没钱
[48:09]	If anything goes wrong,	一旦出现问题
[48:11]	they’re gonna walk away from the mortgage.	他们就还不了房贷
[48:13]	This is not a loan you’d really make, right?	这笔贷款压根就不该借出 不是吗
[48:16]	You’ve gotta be crazy.	疯子才会这么干
[48:18]	But somehow,	但不知为何
[48:19]	you took 8,000 of these loans	你就能贷到八千笔这种贷款
[48:21]	and by the time the guys were done at Goldman Sachs and the rating agencies,	一直到到高盛和评级机构的人受处罚时
[48:21]		价格平易近人的豪宅 每月支付1890美元
[48:26]	two-thirds of the loans were rated AAA,	这些贷款中三分之二被评为AAA级
[48:29]	which meant they were rated as safe as government securities.	这意味着它们跟国债一样安全
[48:32]	It’s, it’s utterly mad.	完全就是疯了
[48:35]	Goldman Sachs sold at least 3.1 billion dollars’ worth	高盛公司在2006上半年至少出售了
[48:38]	of these toxic CDOs in the first half of 2006.	价值31亿美元这种危险的CDO
[48:42]	The CEO of Goldman Sachs at this time was Henry Paulson,	时任高盛公司CEO的是亨利·保尔森
[48:47]	the highest-paid CEO on Wall Street.	华尔街收入最高的CEO
[48:52]	Good morning, welcome to the White House.	早上好 欢迎来到白宫
[48:53]	I am pleased to announce that	在此我荣幸宣布
[48:54]	I will nominate Henry Paulson	将提名亨利·保尔森
[48:55]	to be the secretary of the Treasury.	为财政部长
[48:58]	He has a lifetime of business experience,	他毕生从事商业
[49:00]	he has an intimate knowledge of financial markets,	对金融市场有深刻了解
[49:03]	he has earned a reputation for candor and integrity.	有着坦率正直的声誉
[49:06]	You might think it would be hard for Paulson	你或许觉得政府的微薄薪水
[49:08]	to adjust to a meager government salary.	会令保尔森难以适应
[49:11]	But taking the job as Treasury	但接受财政部长一职
[49:13]	secretary was the best financial decision of his life.	是他一生中最正确的理财决定
[49:17]	Paulson had to sell his 485 million dollars	保尔森在上任前不得不出售
[49:19]	of Goldman stock when he went to work for the government.	其价值四亿八千五百万的高盛股票
[49:23]	But because of a law passed by the first President Bush,	但根据老布什在任时通过的一项法律
[49:26]	he didn’t have to pay any taxes on it.	他不必为此纳税
[49:29]	It saved him 50 million dollars.	这为他节省了五千万美金
[49:32]		2007年艾伦·斯隆发表了一篇文章 聚焦保尔森任CEO最后一个月内所发行的CDO
[49:39]		垃圾房产 从一个例子解读次级抵押贷款如何变质
[49:39]	The article came out in October of 2007.	文章于2007年十月发表
[49:42]	Already, a third of the mortgages defaulted.	在此之前 已有三分之一的按揭贷款被拖欠
[49:42]		贷款额超过一万五千亿美元 损失约两千亿 数千家庭将被收回房产
[49:46]	Now, uh, most of them are goin’.	而今 绝大部分都处于拖欠状态
[49:51]	One group that had purchased these	如今已经一文不值的这些证券
[49:52]	now-worthless securities	当时的买主包括
[49:54]	was the Public Employees Retirement System of Mississippi,	密西西比州公务员退休金系统
[49:58]	which provides monthly benefits to over 80,000 retirees.	该系统要为超过八万退休人员按月提供津贴
[50:02]	They lost millions of dollars,	他们损失了上百万美金
[50:05]	and are now suing Goldman Sachs.	现在正起诉高盛公司
[50:21]	By late 2006, Goldman had taken things a step further.	2006年年末 高盛公司行为更甚
[50:26]	It didn’t just sell toxic CDOs	他们不再限于出售危险CDO
[50:28]	it started actively betting against them	一方面告知客户
[50:31]	at the same time it was telling customers	这些CDO为优质投资产品
[50:32]	that they were high-quality investments.	另一方面却对其反向投保
[50:36]	By purchasing credit default swaps from AIG,	通过购买AIG的信用违约互换产品
[50:40]	Goldman could bet against CDOs it didn’t own,	高盛公司得以给不属于他们的CDO反向投保
[50:43]	and get paid when the CDOs failed.	并在这些CDO亏损时获利
[50:47]	I asked them if anybody called the customers,	我问过他们有没有人给客户打过电话
[50:48]		艾伦·斯隆 《财富杂志》高级编辑
[50:51]	and said, you know,	告诉他们说
[50:52]	we don’t really like this kind of mortgage anymore,	我们不再那么看好这类贷款了
[50:54]	and we thought you ought to know, you know.	觉得有必要让你们知情
[50:57]	They, they didn’t really say anything	他们 他们什么也没说
[50:59]	but, you know, you could just feel the laughter	但你能感觉到电话那边
[51:00]	coming over the phone.	他们在偷笑
[51:03]	Goldman Sachs bought at least	高盛公司购买了
[51:04]	22 billion dollars of credit default swaps from AIG.	至少22亿美金的AIG信用违约互换产品
[51:08]	It was so much	数额如此之巨
[51:09]	that Goldman realized that AIG itself might go bankrupt.	让高盛意识到AIG本身或许会因此破产
[51:13]	So they spent 150 million dollars	所以他们又花了一亿五千万
[51:15]	insuring themselves against AIG’s potential collapse.	为自己投保 以防AIG崩溃
[51:20]	Then, in 2007, Goldman went even further.	然后在2007年 高盛变本加厉
[51:23]	They started selling CDOs specifically designed	他们开始出售特别设计的CDO
[51:26]	so that the more money their customers lost,	这样他们的客户损失越多
[51:28]	the more money Goldman Sachs made.	高盛就赚得越多
[51:39]	Six hundred million dollars, Timberwolf Securities is what you sold.	你一共销售了六亿美金的森林狼证券
[51:39]		卡尔·莱文议员(民主党-密歇根州) 政府事务调查小组委员会主席
[51:43]	Before you sold them,	出售之前
[51:46]	this is what your sales team were tellin’ to each other.	你的销售团队里是这么讨论的
[51:50]	Boy, that Timberwolf was one shitty deal.	老天 那个森林狼真是单狗屎生意
[51:54]	This was an e-mail to me in late June.	这是一封六月底寄给我的邮件
[51:57]	Right. And you’re callin’ Timberwolf..	是的 你管森林狼叫…
[51:57]		丹尼尔·斯帕克斯 高盛公司按揭贷款部前主管(2006-2008)
[51:58]	After the transaction.	那是在交易之后
[51:59]	No no, you sold Timberwolf after as well.	不 不 那之后你依然出售了森林狼
[52:03]	W-, we did trades after that.	我 我们确实是在那之后交易
[52:04]	Yeah, okay.	好了
[52:05]	The next e-mail, take a look, July 1, ’07	下一封邮件 看看 07年7月1日
[52:08]	tells the sales force, “The top priority is Timberwolf.”	告诉销售团队 “优先推销森林狼”
[52:12]	Your top priority to sell is that shitty deal.	你们优先推销的就是那单狗屎生意
[52:15]	If you have an adverse interest to your client,	如果你拥有客户的反向权益
[52:17]	do you have the duty to disclose that to your client	你是否有义务告知客户
[52:20]	to tell that client of your adverse interest?	你具有他们的反向权益
[52:22]	That’s my question.	这就是我的问题
[52:23]	Mr. Chairman, I just tryin’ to understand.	主席先生 我不太明白
[52:25]	No, I think you understand it.	不 我认为你明白
[52:26]	I don’t think you want to answer it.	你只是不想回答
[52:28]		苏珊·科林斯参议员(共和党-缅因州) 国土安全和政府事务委员会高级官员
[52:28]	Do you believe that you have a duty to act	你认为自己是否有义务
[52:31]	in the best interests of your clients?	代表客户的最高利益
[52:35]		法布里斯·图尔 高盛集团结构性产品贸易 执行官
[52:35]	Again, uh, uh, Senator, I,	再一次重申 参议员 我
[52:37]	I will repeat, you know,	我再重申一次
[52:38]	we have a, a duty to, to serve our clients	我们有义务为客户服务
[52:40]	by showing prices on transaction where they ask us to show prices for.	根据顾客要求 对其展示交易价值
[52:45]	What do you think about	出售这种
[52:46]	selling securities which your own people think are ?Crap?	自己人认为是垃圾的证券 你怎么看
[52:51]	Does that bother you?	你会觉得不安吗
[52:53]	I think they would, again, as a hypothetical?	我觉得他们会…再问一次 这是假设吗
[52:55]		劳埃德·布兰克费恩 高盛集团董事长&CEO
[52:57]	No. This is real.	不 这是事实
[52:58]	– Well then I don’t – We heard it today.	-好吧 我不 -我们今天听说了
[53:00]	We heard it today: this is a shitty deal, this is crap.	我们都听到了 这是单狗屎生意 这就是垃圾
[53:04]	I, I, I heard nothing today	我今天没有听到任何
[53:06]	that makes me think anything, um, went wrong.	让我感到事态有变的消息
[53:10]	Is there not a conflict when you sell something to somebody,	你向别人出售一种产品
[53:14]	and then are determined to bet against that same security	然后你又赌它会亏损 而且不对买家透露
[53:20]	and you don’t disclose that to the person you’re selling it?	你不觉得这中间有矛盾冲突吗
[53:24]	– In the… – Do you see a problem?	-在 -你看到问题了吗
[53:25]	In the context of market-making, that is not a conflict.	如果是为营造市场 这就不算矛盾冲突
[53:28]		大卫·维尼亚 高盛集团执行副总裁兼首席财务官
[53:28]	When you heard that your employees, in these e-mails, said,	当你听说员工在这些邮件里面说
[53:32]	“God, what a shitty deal, god, what a piece of crap”	“天哪 这真是单狗屎生意 真是垃圾”
[53:35]	do you feel anything?	你有什么感觉吗
[53:36]	I f…, I think that’s very unfortunate to have on e-mail.	它出现在邮件里 我觉得很不合适
[53:39]	Are you b…	你这是吐槽…
[53:41]	And, and, and very unfortunate… I don’t, I don’t…	非常不合适 我不…
[53:44]	On e-mail? How about feeling that way?	别扯没用的 你到底作何感想
[53:47]	I think it’s very unfortunate	我觉得任何人
[53:48]	for anyone to have said that, in any form.	在任何情况下这么说都不适宜
[53:50]	Is it your understanding	你是否认为
[53:51]		汤姆·科本参议员(共和党-俄克拉荷马州) 政府事务调查小组委员会 高级官员
[53:51]	that your competitors were engaged in similar activities?	你们的竞争对手也从事类似活动
[53:55]	Uh, yes. And, and to a greater extent than us, in most cases.	是的 而且多数情况下比我们行为更甚
[54:00]	Hedge fund manager John Paulson	对冲基金经理约翰·保尔森
[54:02]	made 12 billion dollars	从抵押市场反向投保中
[54:03]	betting against the mortgage market.	获利十二亿美金
[54:06]	When John Paulson ran out of mortgage securities to bet against,	当约翰·保尔森没有按揭证券可以反向投保时
[54:09]	he worked with Goldman Sachs	他便与高盛和德意志银行合作
[54:10]	and Deutsche Bank to create more of them.	创造出更多的按揭贷款证券
[54:14]	Morgan Stanley was also selling	摩根士丹利同样出售了
[54:15]	mortgage securities that it was betting against,	自己反向投保的按揭贷款证券
[54:18]	and it’s now being sued by the government employees retirement fund	如今正被维京群岛公务员退休基金
[54:21]	of the Virgin Islands for fraud.	以诈骗罪名起诉
[54:25]	The lawsuit alleges that	诉讼书中声称
[54:26]	Morgan Stanley knew that the CDOs were junk.	摩根士丹利明知这些CDO毫无价值
[54:29]	Although they were rated AAA,	尽管它们的评级为AAA
[54:30]	Morgan Stanley was betting they would fail.	摩根士丹利仍下注其会亏损
[54:34]	A year later, Morgan Stanley had made hundreds of millions of dollars,	一年后 摩根士丹利从中获利上百亿美元
[54:38]	while the investors had lost almost all of their money.	而投资者 则近乎倾家荡产
[54:47]		对冲基金Tricadia和Magnetar 曾与美林 摩根大通和雷曼兄弟共同设计CDO 而后又对这些CDO反向投保
[54:58]	You would have thought that pension funds would have said,	你原本以为退休基金会说
[54:59]	“Those are subprime why am I buying them?”	“这是次贷 我们买这些干嘛”
[55:05]	And they had these guys at Moody’s	然后那些穆迪和标准普尔的人
[55:07]	and Standard and Poor’s who said, that’s a AAA.	就会告诉你 这些都是AAA级的
[55:10]		比尔·阿克曼 对冲基金经理
[55:11]	None of these securities got issued	没有得到许可
[55:12]	without the imprimatur, you know,	证券就无法发行
[55:14]	the Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval, of the rating agencies.	也就是评级机构的内部批准章
[55:17]	The three rating agencies	三大评级机构
[55:18]	Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch	穆迪 标准普尔和惠誉
[55:22]	made billions of dollars giving high ratings	通过给高风险证券高评级
[55:24]	to risky securities.	赚了几十亿美元
[55:26]	Moody’s, the largest rating agency,	穆迪 作为最大的评级机构
[55:29]	quadrupled its profits between 2000 and 2007.	2000年到2007年间 利润翻了两番
[55:34]	Moody’s and S&P get compensated based on	穆迪和标准普尔获利方式
[55:34]		比尔·阿克曼 对冲基金经理
[55:36]	putting out ratings reports.	就是给出评级报告
[55:37]	And the more structured securities they gave a AAA rating to,	他们给出的AAA评级越多
[55:41]	the higher their earnings were gonna be for the quarter.	每季度获利就越多
[55:43]	Imagine if you went to the New York Times,	就像是 如果你去《纽约时报》报社
[55:44]	and you said, look, if you write a positive story,	然后说 你写一篇正面的报道
[55:46]	I’ll pay you 500,000 dollars.	我就给你五十万美元
[55:47]	But if you don’t, I’ll give you nothing.	如果你不写 那就一分都没有
[55:49]	The rating agencies could have stopped the party, and said:	评级机构本可以停止这场闹剧 然后说
[55:50]		杰罗姆·冯斯 穆迪评级公司 前常务董事
[55:52]	We’re sorry. You know. We’re gonna tighten our standards.	很抱歉 我们准备提高标准了
[55:55]	This is ?And,	现在这样…
[55:56]	and, and immediately cut off	然后马上切断
[55:58]	a lot of the flow of funding to risky borrowers.	大量流向危险借贷者的资金
[56:01]	AAA-rated instruments mushroomed	发出去的AAA评级
[56:05]	from just a handful to thousands and thousands.	迅速从少量膨胀到数千
[56:11]	Hundreds of billions of dollars, uh, were being rated.	价值上千亿美元的产品 接受评级
[56:13]	You know ?And…	知道吗 而且…
[56:16]	– Per year. – Per year; oh, yeah.	-每年吗 -是的 每年
[56:18]		弗兰克·帕特诺伊 加州大学圣地亚哥分校法律和金融教授
[56:18]	I’ve now testified before both houses of Congress on the credit rating agency issue.	我已在国会两院就信用评级机构问题作证
[56:23]	And both times, they trot out	那两次 他们都请出
[56:26]	very prominent First Amendment lawyers,	专攻宪法第一修正案的大律师
[56:29]	and argue that when we say something is rated AAA,	辩解称我们给出AAA级时
[56:33]	that is merely our opinion you shouldn’t rely on it.	那只是我们的”一家之言” 不应过分依赖
[56:37]	S&P’s ratings express our opinion.	标准普尔评级代表我们的意见
[56:37]		迪文·沙马 标准普尔信用评级公司
[56:39]	Our ratings are, uh, are our opinions.	我们的评级仅是我们的意见
[56:42]		史蒂芬·乔因特 惠誉评级
[56:42]	They are opinions.	一家之言
[56:42]		雷蒙德·麦克丹尼尔 穆迪公司
[56:42]	Opinions. And those, they’re just opinions.	一家之言 只是一家之言
[56:45]	I think we are emphasizing the fact that our ratings are,	我觉得我们要强调一个事实 我们的评级
[56:49]	are opinions.	只是一家之言
[56:56]		迪文·沙马 标准普尔信用评级公司
[56:56]	They do not speak to the market value of a security,	他们不告知证券的市场价值
[56:59]	the volatility of its price,	价格的易变性
[57:01]	or its suitability as an investment.	以及是否适合用作投资
[57:22]	We have so many economists coming on our air, and saying,	有很多经济学出现在我们直播中 都说
[57:25]	oh, this is a bubble, and it’s going to burst,	这是泡沫 迟早会破灭的
[57:27]	and this is going to be a real issue for the economy.	这会对经济造成巨大影响
[57:30]	Some say it could even cause a recession at some point.	有人说甚至有可能会导致经济衰退
[57:33]	What is the worst-case scenario, if in fact we were to see	假设说全国房价真的大幅下跌
[57:36]	prices come down substantially across the country?	所导致的最坏的情况会是怎样
[57:40]	Well, I, I guess I don’t buy your premise.	我不认同你的前提假设
[57:41]	It’s a pretty unlikely possibility.	这几乎不可能出现
[57:43]	We’ve never had a decline in house prices	我们从来没有出现过
[57:45]	on a nationra-, ba-, a nationwide basis.	全国范围内的房价大跌
[57:47]	Ben Bernanke became chairman of the Federal Reserve Board in February 2006,	本·伯南克于2006年2月上任美联储主席
[57:52]	the top year for subprime lending.	那也是次级贷款的巅峰年
[57:56]	But despite numerous warnings,	尽管受到诸多警告
[57:58]	Bernanke and the Federal Reserve Board did nothing.	伯南克与美联储没有采取任何措施
[58:06]	Robert Gnaizda met with ben Bernanke	自伯南克上任后
[58:08]	and the Federal Reserve Board three times	罗伯特·那兹达曾三度与本·伯南克
[58:10]	after Bernanke became chairman.	及联邦储备委员会委员会面
[58:12]	Only at the last meeting	直至最后一次会面
[58:15]	did he suggest that there was a problem,	他才暗示可能存在问题
[58:18]	and that the government ought to look into it.	并且应当得到政府的重视
[58:20]	When? When was that? What year?	那是什么时候 哪一年
[58:22]	It’s 2009, March 11th, in D.C.	2009年3月11日 当时在特区
[58:26]	– This year. – This year we met, yes.	-今年吗 -对 今年会面的时候
[58:27]	And so for the two previous years you met him,	这么说 前两次会面他都没有提过吗
[58:30]	– even in 2008? – Yes	-08年也没提? -没提
[58:33]	One of the six Federal Reserve Board governors	伯南克手下六名美联储理事
[58:35]	serving under Bernanke was Frederic Mishkin,	其中就包括弗雷德里克·米什金
[58:38]	who was appointed by President Bush in 2006.	由布什总统于2006年任命
[58:42]	Did you participate in the semiannual meetings that, uh,	你参加了罗伯特·那兹达和格林宁研究所
[58:42]		弗雷德里克·米什金 美联储理事(2006-2008)
[58:45]	Robert Gnaizda and, and, uh, Greenlining had with the Federal Reserve Board?	与美联储共同召开的半年度会议吗
[58:49]	Yes I did. I was actually on the committee that, uh,	是的 我当时在委员会里
[58:52]	that was involved, involved with that the Consumer and Community Affairs Committee.	消费者与共同体事务委员会
[58:55]	He warned, in an extremely explicit manner,	他对当时的情况
[58:58]	about what was going on	提出了明确警告
[58:59]	and he came to the Federal Reserve Board with loan documentation	而且带着贷款文件来到美联储
[59:02]	of the kind of loans that were frequently being made.	当时那种贷款交易非常频繁
[59:05]	And he was listened to politely, and nothing was done.	你们礼貌地听了他的意见 但毫无动作
[59:09]	Yeah. So, uh, I, I don’t know the details,	对 其实我不太清楚这里面的细节
[59:12]	in terms of, of, uh, of, um. Uh, in fact, I, I just don’t ?I, I.	根据 呃 实际上 我不…我 我
[59:18]	whatever information he provide, I’m not sure exactly, I, eh, uh	不管他提供了什么信息 我都不能完全
[59:21]	it’s, it’s actually, to be honest with you,	其实是这样 老实说
[59:23]	I can’t remember the, the, this kind of discussion.	我不记得讨论过这种问题
[59:25]	But certainly, uh, there, there were issues that were, uh, uh, coming up.	但可以肯定的是 当时确实有问题出现
[59:30]	But then the question is, how pervasive are they?	但随之而来的是 这些问题有多严重
[59:33]	Why didn’t you try looking?	你们怎么没去调查
[59:34]	I think that people did.	我认为有人调查过了
[59:35]	We had people looking at,	我们有派人调查
[59:36]	a whole group of people looking at this,for whatever reason.	原因不重要 但我们派了一组人去调查
[59:38]	Excuse me, you can’t be serious.	抱歉 你肯定是在说笑吧
[59:39]	If you would have looked, you would have found things.	如果你们调查过 肯定会有所发现
[59:41]	Uh, you know, that’s very, very easy	要知道 说起来容易
[59:43]	to always say that you can always find it.	肯定会有所发现 这话说起来简单
[59:45]	As early as 2004,	早在2004年年初
[59:48]	the FBI was already warning about an epidemic of mortgage fraud.	FBI曾就抵押贷款诈骗流行作出警告
[59:52]	They reported inflated appraisals,	其中提到了夸虚增估价
[59:54]	doctored loan documentation, and other fraudulent activity.	篡改贷款文件以及其他欺诈活动
[59:59]	In 2005, the IMF’s chief economist, Raghuram Rajan,	2005年IMF首席经济学家拉古拉姆·瑞占
[1:00:04]	warned that dangerous incentives could lead to a crisis.	警告说 危险的刺激奖励机制可能会导致危机
[1:00:08]	Then came Nouriel Roubini’s warnings in 2006	然后在2006年 鲁里埃尔·鲁比尼也作出警告
[1:00:09]		中央银行为何应该戳破泡沫 鲁里埃尔·鲁比尼
[1:00:12]	Allan Sloan’s articles in	2007年艾伦·斯隆
[1:00:13]	fortune magazine and the Washington Post in 2007	也在《财富杂志》和《华盛顿邮报》上发表文章
[1:00:17]	and repeated warnings from the IMF.	还有来自IMF不断的警告
[1:00:19]	I said it, and on behalf of the institution:	我代表机构这么说过
[1:00:20]		多米尼克·斯特劳斯-卡恩 国际货币基金总裁
[1:00:21]	ah, the crisis which is in front of us is a huge crisis.	我们面临的危机是巨大的
[1:00:25]	Who did you talk to?	你跟谁说的
[1:00:27]	The government, Treasury, s-, Fed, everybody.	政府 财政部 美联储 所有人
[1:00:29]	In May of 2007, hedge fund manager Bill Ackman	2007年5月 对冲基金经理比尔·阿克曼
[1:00:33]	circulated a presentation called “Who’s Holding the Bag?”,	做了一个报告 题为《谁是幕后黑手》
[1:00:36]	which described how the bubble would unravel.	描述了泡沫将会如何破灭
[1:00:40]	And in early 2008, Charles Morris	而在2008年初 查尔斯·莫里斯
[1:00:42]	published his book about the impending crisis.	出版了关于即将到来的危机的著作
[1:00:49]	You’re just not sure, what do you do?	你不知道该怎么办
[1:00:49]		弗雷德里克·米什金 美联储理事(2006-2008)
[1:00:51]	And you, you might have some suspicions	你或许会怀疑
[1:00:52]	that underwriting standards are being weakened	贷款标准正在降低
[1:00:54]	but then the question is, should you do anything about it?	但随后的问题是 你应该有所行动吗
[1:01:00]	By 2008, home foreclosures were skyrocketing,	到2008年 房产抵押收回量激增
[1:01:04]	and the securitization food chain imploded.	证券化食物链断裂
[1:01:07]	Lenders could no longer sell their loans to the investment banks	贷方无法再向投资银行出售贷款
[1:01:11]	and as the loans went bad,	而一旦贷款无法偿还
[1:01:12]	dozens of lenders failed	大量放贷人破产
[1:01:15]	Chuck Prince, of Citibank, famously said that,	花旗银行的查克·普林斯有一句名言
[1:01:15]		乔治·索罗斯 索罗斯基金董事长
[1:01:21]	we have to dance until the music stops.	音乐不停 我们的舞步就不能停
[1:01:24]	Actually, the music had stopped already when he said that.	但其实他说这句话时 音乐已经停了
[1:01:28]	The market for CDOs collapsed,	CDO市场崩盘
[1:01:30]	leaving the investment banks holding hundreds of billions of dollars	让投资银行数千亿美元被套牢
[1:01:34]	in loans, CDOs, and real estate they couldn’t sell.	包括卖不出去的贷款 CDO和不动产
[1:01:38]	When the crisis started both the Bush administration	危机一开始的时候 布什政府
[1:01:43]	and the Federal Reserve were totally behind the curve.	和美联储都被蒙在鼓里
[1:01:47]	They did not understand the extent of it.	他们不知道范围有多广
[1:01:49]	At what point do you remember thinking, for the first time,	你记得是在什么时候 开始意识到
[1:01:49]		克里斯汀.拉嘉德 法国财政部长
[1:01:53]	this is dangerous, this is bad?	这种情况很危险 很糟糕
[1:01:56]	I remember very well, uh, one	我记得很清楚
[1:01:59]	I think it was a G7 meeting, of February 2008.	是在2008年2月七国财长会议(G7)上
[1:02:02]	And I remember discussing the issue with, with Hank Paulson.	我记得我和亨利·保尔森讨论这个问题
[1:02:06]	And I clearly remember telling Hank:	我清楚地记得我跟亨利说
[1:02:10]	we are watching this tsunami coming.	我们眼睁睁的看着海啸来临
[1:02:13]	And you just proposing that we ask which swimming costume we are going to put on.	你居然还在关心我们该穿上什么泳衣
[1:02:20]	What was his response, what was his feeling?	他是怎么回答的 他有什么感受
[1:02:22]	Things are pretty much under control. Yes, we are looking at,	事情还在控制之中 我们正在调查
[1:02:26]	this situation carefully, and uh	正在仔细调查
[1:02:29]	yeah, it’s under control.	都在控制之中
[1:02:32]	We’re gonna keep growing, okay? And obviously, I’ll say it:	我们要保持增长 而且很明显 我这么说吧
[1:02:32]		2008年2月9日 东京 七国财长会议
[1:02:36]	if you’re growing, you’re not in recession, right?	如果你还在增长 那就没有衰退 对吗
[1:02:40]	I mean,we all know that.	这是众所周知的
[1:02:42]		保尔森发表此言论四个月前 经济其实就已经开始衰退
[1:02:49]	In March of 2008, the investment bank Bear Stearns ran out of cash,	2008年3月 贝尔斯登投资银行现金耗尽
[1:02:54]	and was acquired for two dollars a share by JP Morgan Chase.	并以每股两美元被摩根大通集团收购
[1:02:57]	The deal was backed by 30 billion dollars	这项交易得到美联储
[1:03:00]	in emergency guarantees from the Federal Reserve.	300亿美元的紧急担保支持
[1:03:04]	That was the time when the administration could have come in,	就在那个时候 政府原本可以介入
[1:03:05]		西蒙·约翰逊 MIT教授 IMF前任首席经济学家
[1:03:07]	and put in place various kinds of measures	采取各种措施
[1:03:11]	that would have reduced system risk.	以降低系统风险
[1:03:13]	The information that I’m receiving from some entities	据我从一些单位了解的信息来看
[1:03:16]	is the end is not here, that there are other shoes to fall.	事情还没有结束 还有更多问题会发生
[1:03:21]	I’ve seen those investment banks	我看到很多投资银行
[1:03:23]	working with the Fed and the SEC	与美联储和证监会合作
[1:03:26]	to strengthen their liquidity,	来加强贴现能力
[1:03:29]	to strengthen their the, their capital positions.	来改善资产状况
[1:03:33]	I get reports all the time.	我经常收到这类报告
[1:03:35]	Our regulators are, are very vigilant.	我们的监管机构 是高度警觉的
[1:03:38]	On September 7th, 2008	2008年9月7日
[1:03:40]	Henry Paulson announced the federal takeover	亨利·保尔森宣布联邦政府将收购
[1:03:42]	of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,	房利美和房地美
[1:03:45]	two giant mortgage lenders on the brink of collapse.	两家濒临破产的大型房贷机构
[1:03:48]	Nothing about our actions today	我们今天的行动
[1:03:50]	in any way reflects a changed view of the housing correction	并不代表房地产业矫正 相较以往有变
[1:03:55]	or the strength of other U.S. Financial institutions.	或其他美国金融机构实力上有任何变化
[1:03:57]	Two days later, Lehman Brothers announced record losses	两天后 雷曼兄弟报历史最大亏损
[1:04:00]	of 3.2 billion dollars, and its stock collapsed.	亏损3.2亿美元 股价暴跌
[1:04:05]	The effects of Lehman and AIG in September	九月份的雷曼和AIG效应
[1:04:06]		大卫·麦考密克 布什政府财政部副部长
[1:04:08]	still came as a surprise.	还是让人始料未及
[1:04:10]	I mean, this is even after July, and Fannie and Freddie.	这还是在七月房利美和房利美事件发生后
[1:04:13]	So clearly, there was stuff that as of September,	所以很显然 有些情况 而且是重要情况
[1:04:18]	major stuff that nobody knew about.	直到九月还是没人知道
[1:04:23]	I think that’s, I think that’s fair.	我想 可以这么说
[1:04:25]	Bear Stearns was rated AAA,	贝尔斯登在破产前一个月
[1:04:25]		杰罗姆·冯斯 穆迪评级公司前常务董事
[1:04:27]	like, a month before it went bankrupt?	仍然是AAA的评级吗
[1:04:29]	– Uh, more likely A2. – A2.	-实际上是AA -AA
[1:04:32]	– Yeah. – Okay.	-是的 -好吧
[1:04:33]	A2 is still not bankrupt.	AA跟破产仍然差很远
[1:04:35]	No no no. No.	是这样的
[1:04:36]	That’s, that’s a high investment grade, solid investment-grade rating	AA是个很高的固定资产投资评级
[1:04:39]	Lehman Brothers, A2, within days of failing.	雷曼兄弟在破产前也是AA
[1:04:42]	Um, AIG, AA, within days of being bailed out.	AIG在接受政府救助时也是AA
[1:04:47]	Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were AAA when they were rescued.	房利美和房地美被拯救时是AAA
[1:04:52]	Um, Citigroup, Merrill; all, all of ’em had investment-grade ratings.	花旗和美林 它们的评级都达到了投资级别
[1:04:56]	How can that be?	这怎么可能呢
[1:04:57]	Well, that’s a good question. That’s a great question	这个问题问的好 问的相当好
[1:05:02]	At no point did the administration ever go to all the major institutions,	政府从来没有去所有的大型机构
[1:05:02]		大卫·麦考密克 布什政府财政部副部长
[1:05:06]	and say, this is serious, tell us what your positions are, you know,	说情况很严峻 你们把现状告诉我
[1:05:10]	uh, no bullshit, where are you?	别胡扯 情况到底如何 有过吗
[1:05:15]	Well, first, that’s what the regulators,	首先 他们是监管机构
[1:05:17]	that’s their job, right?	那是他们的职责 对吧
[1:05:18]	Their job is to understand the exposure	他们的职责就是去了解
[1:05:20]	across these different institutions,	不同机构中存在的问题
[1:05:22]	and they have a very refined, uh, understanding	而且他们了解得非常精准
[1:05:25]	that I think became more respon, more refined	在我看来 随着危机的继续
[1:05:28]	as the crisis, um, proceeded. So…	而愈加精准
[1:05:30]	Forgive me, but that’s clearly not true. I’m	很抱歉 但这话显然不对 我
[1:05:34]	What do you mean, it’s not true?	你说这话不对是什么意思
[1:05:35]	In August of 2008, were you aware of the	2008年8月时 你是否知晓
[1:05:35]		弗雷德里克·米什金 美联储理事(2006-2008) 哥伦比亚大学经济学院教授
[1:05:38]	the credit ratings held then	雷曼兄弟 美林银行
[1:05:41]	by Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, AIG	和AIG当时的信用级别
[1:05:44]	and did you think that they were accurate?	你认为这个评价准确吗
[1:05:46]	Well, uh, er, uh, certainly by that time, it was clear	当然在那个时候 很明显
[1:05:51]	that that earlier credit ratings were inaccurate,	之前的信用级别不太精确
[1:05:53]	because they had been downgraded substantially.	因为他们的信用级别大体在下降
[1:05:55]	No, they hadn’t.	没有降
[1:05:56]	Uh, there’s still, there was still some downgrading,	还是有一点 有一点下降的
[1:05:57]	in terms of the, the industry, concerns of the ind-,	从整个金融业来看 宏观上…
[1:05:59]	certainly the stock prices	股价当然降了
[1:06:01]	Not some, all those firms were rated at least A2	一点都没降 直到他们被救助的前几天
[1:06:03]	until a couple of days before they, uh, were rescued.	那些公司都至少是AA级评级
[1:06:06]	Well then, you know, then the answer is,	好吧 那我只能说
[1:06:07]	I just don’t, don’t know enough to	我不 我了解不多
[1:06:08]	really answer your question on this particular issue.	在这个问题上无力为你答疑解惑
[1:06:10]	Governor Fred Mishkin is resigning, effective August 31.	弗雷德里克·米什金理事于8月31日正式辞职
[1:06:14]	He says he plans to return to his teaching post	他说他打算回到哥伦比亚大学
[1:06:16]	at Columbia’s Graduate School of Business.	研究生学院的教职岗位
[1:06:18]	Why did you leave the Federal Reserve in August of 2008?	你为什么在08年8月离开美联储
[1:06:21]	I mean, in, in the middle of the worst financial crisis	就在金融危机最严重的时候
[1:06:25]	So, so, uh, that, uh, I had to, to revise a textbook.	我要去修正教材
[1:06:28]	His departure leaves the fed board with	他的离职使得美联储董事会
[1:06:31]	three of its seven seats vacant	在经济最危急之时
[1:06:32]		弗雷德里克·米什金 美联储理事
[1:06:32]	just when the economy needs it most.	七个席位空出三个
[1:06:34]	Well, I’m sure your textbook is important and widely read.	我确信你的教材很重要 而且读者众多
[1:06:36]	But in August of 2008, you know,	但在08年8月
[1:06:39]	some, somewhat more important things were going on in the world,	这个世界上 还有更要紧的事情正在发生
[1:06:41]	don’t you think?	你不觉得吗
[1:06:44]	By Friday, September 12th,	到9月12日 星期五
[1:06:46]	Lehman Brothers had run out of cash,	雷曼兄弟现金耗尽
[1:06:48]	and the entire investment banking industry was sinking fast.	整个投资银行业正迅速衰退
[1:06:52]	The stability of the global financial system was in jeopardy.	世界金融体系的稳定也岌岌可危
[1:06:56]	That weekend, Henry Paulson and Timothy Geithner,	那个周末 亨利·保尔森和蒂莫西·盖特纳
[1:07:00]	president of the New York Federal Reserve	纽约联邦储蓄银行董事长
[1:07:02]	called an emergency meeting with the CEOs of the major banks	和几大银行的总裁召开了紧急会议
[1:07:06]	in an effort to rescue Lehman.	目的在于救助雷曼兄弟
[1:07:08]	But Lehman wasn’t alone.	但还不止雷曼一家
[1:07:11]	Merrill Lynch, another major investment bank,	美林银行 另一家大型投资银行
[1:07:13]	was also on the brink of failure.	也处在崩溃边缘
[1:07:15]	And that Sunday, it was acquired by Bank of America.	在那个周日 它被美国银行接管
[1:07:19]	The only bank interested in buying Lehman	只有一家银行有意向收购美林
[1:07:21]	was the British firm Barclays.	那是英国的巴克莱公司
[1:07:24]	But British regulators demanded	但是英国监管机构
[1:07:25]	a financial guarantee from the U.S. Government.	要求美国政府进行财务担保
[1:07:29]	Paulson refused.	保尔森拒绝了
[1:07:35]	We all jumped into a yellow cab	我们一起上了出租车
[1:07:35]		哈维·米勒 雷曼公司破产程序律师 威嘉律师事务所
[1:07:39]	and went down to the Federal Reserve Bank.	去联邦储备银行
[1:07:42]	They wanted the bankruptcy case	他们希望破产事宜
[1:07:44]	commenced before midnight of September 14.	能在9月14日午夜之前开始
[1:07:48]	We kept pressing that this would be a, uh, terrible event.	我们一直强调 这件事可能会很严重
[1:07:54]	And at some point, I used the word “Armageddon.”	这当中 我还用到了”浩劫”这个词
[1:07:57]	Had they fully considered	他们是否充分考虑过
[1:07:58]	the consequences of what they were proposing?	他们的提议所带来的后果
[1:08:02]	The effect on the market would be extraordinary.	这对市场的影响将是巨大的
[1:08:05]	– You said this? – Yes.	-这是你说的 -是的
[1:08:07]	They just said they had considered	他们只说 我们所说的这些
[1:08:08]	all of the comments that we had made	他们都已经考虑过
[1:08:12]	and they were still of the belief	而且他们仍然确信
[1:08:13]	that in order to calm the markets and move forward	为稳定市场 使其继续运行
[1:08:18]	it was necessary for Lehman to go into bankruptcy.	雷曼兄弟就必须宣布破产
[1:08:22]	– Calm the markets? – Yes.	-稳定市场 -是的
[1:08:23]	When were you first told	你第一次听说
[1:08:24]		克里斯汀.拉嘉德 法国财政部长
[1:08:25]	that Lehman in fact was going to go bankrupt?	雷曼兄弟将宣布破产是什么时候
[1:08:28]	Ah, after the fact.	在破产以后
[1:08:30]	After the fact?	破产以后
[1:08:33]	Wow. Okay.	好吧
[1:08:36]	And what was your reaction when you learned of it?	你听说这一消息时 什么反应
[1:08:42]	Holy cow.	真要命
[1:08:44]	Paulson and Bernanke had not consulted with other governments	保尔森和伯南克没和其他国家政府商议
[1:08:47]	and didn’t understand the consequences of foreign bankruptcy laws.	也不明白其他国家破产法将导致的后果
[1:08:52]	Under British law,	根据英国法律
[1:08:53]	Lehman’s London office had to be closed immediately.	雷曼兄弟在伦敦的部门必须立即关闭
[1:08:58]	All transactions came to a halt.	所有的交易都终止了
[1:08:59]	And there are thousands and thousands and thousands of transactions.	而他们手头有无数 无数 无数的交易
[1:09:03]	The hedge funds who had had assets with Lehman in London	那些与雷曼有合作的伦敦对冲基金
[1:09:06]	discovered overnight, to their complete horror,	短短一夜之间 如梦魇一般
[1:09:09]	that they couldn’t get those assets back.	资产就此套牢其中 拿不回来
[1:09:11]	One of the points of the hub failed.	核心集团的一员倒下了
[1:09:14]		萨蒂亚吉特·达斯 《交易员,枪和钞票》的作者
[1:09:14]	And that had huge knock-on effects around the system.	而且冲击了整个体系
[1:09:17]	The oldest money market fund in the nation	本国资历最老的货币市场基金
[1:09:19]	wrote off roughly three quarters of a billion dollars in bad debt	将由现已破产的雷曼兄弟发行的十亿坏账
[1:09:24]	issued by the now-bankrupt Lehman Brothers.	其中大约四分之三从账面勾销
[1:09:26]	Lehman’s failure also caused	雷曼兄弟的破产也导致
[1:09:27]	a collapse in the commercial paper market,	商业票据市场全盘崩溃
[1:09:28]		商业票据 (单位: 十亿)
[1:09:30]	which many companies depend on	许多公司都依赖这一市场
[1:09:31]	to pay for operating expenses, such as payroll.	以便支付运营花销 例如工资
[1:09:35]	That means maybe they have to lay off employees	这就意味着他们必须裁掉部分员工
[1:09:36]	they can’t buy parts.	无法买入材料
[1:09:37]	It stops business in its tracks.	导致商业脱离正常轨道
[1:09:40]	Suddenly, people stood, and said,	突然之间 人们停下脚步说
[1:09:40]		吉莲·邰蒂 《金融时报》美国版总编辑
[1:09:41]	Listen, what can we believe in?	还有什么我们可以信任
[1:09:43]	There’s nothing we can trust anymore.	再没什么值得我们相信了
[1:09:45]	That same week, AIG owed 13 billion dollars	同一周 AIG欠信用违约互换持有人
[1:09:49]	to holders of credit default swaps	共130亿美元
[1:09:51]	and it didn’t have the money.	但它拿不出这笔钱
[1:09:53]	AIG was another hub.	AIG是核心集团的另外一员
[1:09:55]	If AIG had stopped, you know,	如果AIG停止运行
[1:09:56]		沈联涛 中国银监会首席顾问
[1:09:57]	all planes may have to be, you know, stop flying.	那么整个行业就要停滞
[1:09:59]	On September 17th, AIG is taken over by the government.	9月17日 AIG由政府接管
[1:10:03]	And one day later, Paulson and Bernanke	一天以后 保尔森和伯南克
[1:10:06]	ask Congress for 700 billion dollars to bail out the banks.	向国会要求政府拨出七千亿救助这些银行
[1:10:11]	They warn that the alternative	他们警示说如果不救助
[1:10:13]	would be a catastrophic financial collapse.	将导致灾难性的金融崩盘
[1:10:16]	It was scary. You know, the entire system froze up	太可怕了 整个体系完全冻结
[1:10:18]	every part of the financial system,	金融体系内各方各面
[1:10:20]	every part of the credit system.	信贷体系内各方各面
[1:10:23]	Nobody could borrow money.	所有人都借不到钱
[1:10:24]	It was like a cardiac arrest of the global financial system.	如同全球金融体系心脏骤停一般
[1:10:27]	I’m playing the hand that was dealt me.	如今我只能兵来将挡 水来土掩
[1:10:30]	A lot of what I am dealing with, you know,	我现在要处理的这些问题
[1:10:32]	I’m dealing with the consequences of things that were done,	很多都是由多年前的行为
[1:10:34]	often, many years ago.	所导致的后果
[1:10:37]	Secretary Paulson spoke throughout the fall.	保尔森部长讲述了崩盘的经过
[1:10:39]	And all the potential root causes of this	还有所有可能引发它的原因
[1:10:41]	and there are plenty he called ’em.	他说了很多原因
[1:10:42]		大卫·麦考密克 布什政府财政部副部长
[1:10:43]	So I, I’m not sure…	所以 我不是很确定
[1:10:44]	You’re not being serious about that, are you?	你这是在开玩笑 对吗
[1:10:46]	I am being serious. What, what would you have expected?	我很严肃 那你觉得应该怎样
[1:10:49]	I’m, what are, what were you looking for that you didn’t see?	我 那么 有什么与你预期不符的地方吗
[1:10:51]	He was the senior advocate	他本人就是资深拥趸
[1:10:54]	for prohibiting the regulation of credit default swaps	鼓吹禁止监管信用违约互换
[1:10:59]	and also lifting the leverage limits on the investment banks.	提高投资银行的举债经营比
[1:11:03]	– So a-, again, what – He mentioned those things?	-还是那句话 -他提过这些吗
[1:11:06]	I never heard him mention those things.	我没听过他提起这些
[1:11:08]	C-, can we turn this off for a second?	能把那个关一会儿吗
[1:11:15]	When AIG was bailed out,	AIG被救助脱离困境后
[1:11:16]	the owners of its credit default swaps	信用违约互换的持有者
[1:11:19]	the most prominent of which was Goldman Sachs	高盛公司作为其中最具影响力的一员
[1:11:22]	were paid 61 billion dollars the next day.	第二天就收到610亿美金
[1:11:25]	Paulson, Bernanke, and Tim Geithner forced AIG	保尔森 伯南克和蒂姆·盖特纳强迫AIG
[1:11:29]	to pay 100 cents on the dollar,	全额付清
[1:11:31]	rather than negotiate lower prices	而非协商低价
[1:11:33]	Eventually, the AIG bailout	最终 救助AIG
[1:11:36]	cost taxpayers over 150 billion dollars.	共耗费纳税人超过1500亿美金
[1:11:40]	A hundred and sixty billion dollars went through AIG	1600亿流向AIG
[1:11:41]		麦克尔·格林伯格 美国商品期货交易委员会 前任副会长(1997-2000)
[1:11:44]	14 billion went to Goldman Sachs.	140亿流向高盛
[1:11:47]	At the same time, Paulson and Geithner forced AIG	与此同时 保尔森和盖特纳迫使AIG
[1:11:50]	to surrender its right to sue Goldman	放弃以欺诈罪名对高盛
[1:11:52]	and the other banks for fraud	和其他几家银行的起诉权
[1:11:55]	Isn’t there a problem when	这种情况合理吗
[1:11:56]	the person in charge of dealing with this crisis	负责处理此次危急的人
[1:12:00]	is the former CEO of Goldman Sachs	正是高盛公司CEO
[1:12:02]	someone who had a major role in causing it?	而高盛本身就是引起危机的罪魁之一
[1:12:06]	Well, I think it’s fair to say that the financial markets today	我觉得应该这么说 如今的金融市场
[1:12:08]	are incredibly complicated.	非常的复杂
[1:12:10]	…supply urgently needed money…	…供给急需用钱
[1:12:12]	On October 4th, 2008, President Bush	2008年10月4日 布什总统
[1:12:16]	signs a 700-billion-dollar bailout bill.	签署了七千亿的救助法案
[1:12:20]	But world stock markets continue to fall,	但世界股市仍持续下跌
[1:12:22]	amid fears that a global recession is now underway.	全球经济衰退的恐惧即将弥漫开来
[1:12:30]	The bailout legislation does nothing	但救助法案对于遏制
[1:12:32]	to stem the tide of layoffs and foreclosures.	大幅裁员和抵押收回并无作用
[1:12:35]	Unemployment in the United states and Europe	美国和欧洲的失业率
[1:12:37]	quickly rises to 10 percent.	飞速增长到百分之十
[1:12:40]	The recession accelerates, and spreads globally.	经济衰退不断加速 并向全球蔓延
[1:12:48]	I began to get really scared,	那时候我真开始怕了
[1:12:48]		查尔斯·莫里斯 《两万亿的消融》作者
[1:12:50]	’cause I hadn’t foreseen	因为我没有预见到
[1:12:52]	the whole world going down at the same rate at the same time.	会出现全球同步的迅速衰退
[1:12:57]	By December of 2008, General Motors and Chrysler	到2008年12月 通用汽车和克莱斯勒
[1:13:01]	are facing bankruptcy.	也面临破产
[1:13:04]	And as U.S. Consumers cut back on spending,	同时 随着美国消费者缩减消费
[1:13:06]	Chinese manufacturers see sales plummet.	中国制造商眼看着销量剧减
[1:13:11]	Over 10 million migrant workers in China lose their jobs.	超过一千万中国农民工失业
[1:13:16]	At the end of the day, the poorest, as always, pay the most.	一如既往 到最后 总是底层人民损失最大
[1:13:21]		中国宏大灯饰工厂 中国广东省
[1:13:25]	Here you can earn a lot of money, like, uh,	你在这里可以挣很多钱 差不多
[1:13:29]	70, 80, uh, U.S. dollars per month.	一个月七八十美金
[1:13:31]		乔安娜·徐 原工厂工人
[1:13:35]	As a farmer in the countryside, you cannot earn as much money.	在乡下当农民的话挣不到这么多钱
[1:13:40]	The workers just wire their salaries to their hometown.	工人们都把钱寄回家乡
[1:13:44]	To give to their families.	给他们的家人
[1:13:48]	The crisis started in America.	那时美国开始出现危机
[1:13:50]	We all know it will be coming to China.	我们都知道危机会蔓延到中国
[1:13:59]	Some of the factories try to cut off some workers.	一些工厂想裁掉一部分工人
[1:14:03]	Some people will get poor because they’ll lose their jobs.	一些人会因为失业而更加贫穷
[1:14:07]	Lives get harder.	生活更加艰难
[1:14:18]	We were growing at about 20 percent.	我们以百分之二十的速度增长
[1:14:21]	It was a super year.	年景非常好
[1:14:21]		帕特里克·丹尼尔 新加坡报业控股集团总编
[1:14:24]	And then we suddenly went to minus nine this quarter.	然后这个季度突然就变为以9个百分点负增长
[1:14:28]	Exports collapsed. And we’re talking like 30 percent.	出口额锐减 差不多百分之三十
[1:14:33]	So we just took a hit, you know, fell off a cliff, boom!	所以我们受到了重创 像是从悬崖跌落
[1:14:37]	Even as the crisis unfolded,	即便是在危机开始后
[1:14:38]		李显龙 新加坡总理
[1:14:39]	we didn’t know how wide it was going to spread,	我们还是不知其影响面会有多大
[1:14:41]	or how severe it was going to be.	影响力会有多严重
[1:14:44]	And we were still hoping that there would be some	当时还是希望会有办法
[1:14:46]	way for us to have a shelter	找到庇护
[1:14:49]	and be, uh, less battered by the storm.	不受到那么大的损害
[1:14:52]	But it is not possible.	但这是不可能的
[1:14:53]	It’s a very globalized world the economies are all linked together.	如今全球一体化 经济紧密相联
[1:15:30]	Every time a home goes into foreclosure,	一旦有房子被抵押收回
[1:15:31]		埃里克·霍珀林 责任贷款中心华盛顿办公室主任
[1:15:32]	it affects everyone who lives around that house.	住在这所房子周围的人都会受影响
[1:15:35]	‘Cause when that property goes on the market,	因为这一房产进入市场后
[1:15:36]	it’s gonna be sold at a lower price	将会被低价出售
[1:15:38]	maybe before it goes on the market, it won’t be well maintained.	也许在其进入市场之前 维护状况就不好
[1:15:42]	We estimate another 9 million homeowners will lose their homes.	我们估计还会有九百万房主失去房产
[1:15:51]	We went out on a weekend to see what houses were for sale.	有一次周末 我们去看有哪些房子出售
[1:15:51]		科伦巴·拉莫斯 加州圣何塞
[1:15:56]	We saw one we liked.	我们看见一间中意的
[1:15:58]	The payment was going to be $3,200.	需要支付3200美金
[1:16:13]	Everything was beautiful, the house was very pretty.	所有的事物都很美好 房子也很不错
[1:16:16]	The payment low. Everything was…	价格也很便宜 一切都
[1:16:18]	We won the lottery.	简直像中彩一样
[1:16:20]	But the reality was when the first payment arrived.	但实际上 当第一期的付款下来的时候
[1:16:28]	I felt very bad for my husband…	我真替我丈夫感到难过
[1:16:33]	…because he works too much. And we have three children.	因为他工作太辛苦了 我们还有三个孩子
[1:16:41]		帐篷城 佛州皮尼拉斯县
[1:16:50]	The vast majority I’ve seen lately, unfortunately,	我最近见到的很多人
[1:16:51]		埃里克·伊万诺斯卡斯 天主教慈善会志愿者
[1:16:51]	are people who have just been hurt by the economy.	都是在金融危机中受创 非常不幸
[1:16:53]	They were living, you know, day to day, paycheck to paycheck,	他们日复一日 靠着微薄薪水过活
[1:16:56]	and unfortunately, that ran out.	不幸的是 连这点薪水也没有了
[1:16:58]	And unemployment isn’t gonna pay a house mortgage	失业了就付不了房屋按揭
[1:17:00]	it’s not gonna pay a car bill.	也付不了汽车账单
[1:17:02]	I was a log-truck driver.	我曾是木材叉车司机
[1:17:04]	And they shut down,	现在都关闭了
[1:17:04]		斯蒂芬·A·斯蒂芬 曾是建筑工人
[1:17:05]	they shut down all the logging systems up there	他们把所有伐木系统都关闭了
[1:17:06]	shut down the sawmills and everything.	锯木厂之类的都关了
[1:17:09]	So I moved down here, I had a construction job.	所以我搬来这里 当建筑工人
[1:17:11]	And the construction jobs got shut down too so things are so tough	然后建筑工程也停了 情况就糟糕了
[1:17:15]	there’s a lot o’ people out there,	这样的人还有很多
[1:17:16]	and pretty soon you’re gonna be seeing more camps like this around	很快就会有越来越多这种帐篷出现在周围
[1:17:19]	because there’s just no jobs right now.	因为现在已经没有工作可做了
[1:17:28]	When the company did well,	公司情况好
[1:17:28]		理查德·福尔德 雷曼兄弟公司CEO
[1:17:30]	we did well.	我们就好
[1:17:33]	When the company did not do well, sir,	如果公司情况不好 先生
[1:17:35]	we did not do well.	我们也就不好
[1:17:37]	The men who destroyed their own companies	那些一手毁掉自己的公司
[1:17:39]	and plunged the world into crisis	并让世界陷入危机的人
[1:17:41]	walked away from the wreckage with their fortunes intact.	得以在混乱中全身而退 财富毫发无损
[1:17:45]	The top five executives at Lehman Brothers	雷曼兄弟的五大高管
[1:17:47]	made over a billion dollars between 2000 and 2007	在2000年至2007年间 赚了十多亿美金
[1:17:52]	and when the firm went bankrupt	当公司破产后
[1:17:53]	they got to keep all the money.	他们得以全额保留这笔财富
[1:17:55]	The system worked.	体制运行良好
[1:17:57]	It doesn’t make any sense for us to make a loan that’s gonna fail,	我们不可能明知贷款无法收回 还去放贷
[1:17:57]		安吉罗·莫兹罗 国家金融服务公司CEO
[1:17:59]	’cause we lose, they lose,	因为我们会亏损 他们会损失
[1:18:01]	the borrower loses, the community loses, and we lose.	借方会损失 团体会损失 到头来我们还是损失
[1:18:04]	Countrywide’s CEO Angelo Mozilo	国家金融服务公司总裁安吉罗·莫兹罗
[1:18:06]	made 470 million dollars between 2003 and 2008.	在2003年至2008年间赚得四亿七千万美金
[1:18:12]	One hundred forty million	其中一亿四千万
[1:18:13]	came from dumping his Countrywide stock	得益于在公司崩溃前十二个月里
[1:18:15]	in the 12 months before the company collapsed.	抛售的国家金融服务公司股票
[1:18:18]	Ultimately, I hold the board accountable when a business fails.	究其最终 公司亏损责任在于董事会
[1:18:21]	‘Cause the board is responsible for hiring and firing the CEO	因为董事会负责任命和卸任总裁
[1:18:23]	and overseeing big strategic decisions.	做出重大战略决策
[1:18:26]	The problem with board composition in America	美国董事会结构的问题在于
[1:18:28]	is the way boards are elected.	董事会选举的方式
[1:18:30]	The boards are pretty much, in many cases, picked by the CEO.	很多情况下 董事会是由总裁选出的
[1:18:33]	The board of directors and the compensation committees	董事会和薪酬委员会
[1:18:33]		斯科特·塔波特 美国金融服务业圆桌组织首席说客
[1:18:36]	are the two bodies best situated	是最适宜决定
[1:18:38]	to determine the pay packages, uh, for executives.	高管薪酬的两个部门
[1:18:41]	How do you think they’ve done over the past 10 years?	你觉得过去十年 他们工作做得如何
[1:18:44]	Well, I think that, if you look at those,	我认为 这方面的话
[1:18:46]	uh, in, I would give about a B. Because…	我的评分是”良” 因为
[1:18:49]	– A B? – Yes.	-“良”? -是的
[1:18:51]	– Not an F. – Not an F, not an F.	-不是”不及格”吗 -没有 不是
[1:18:53]	Stan O’Neal, the CEO of Merrill Lynch	美林银行总裁斯坦利·奥尼尔
[1:18:55]	received 90 million dollars in 2006 and 2007 alone	单在2006年到2007年间 就获利九千万美金
[1:19:00]	After driving his firm into the ground	搞垮公司后
[1:19:02]	Merrill Lynch’s board of directors allowed him to resign	美林董事会允许他辞职
[1:19:03]		股票:一亿三千一百万 现金: 三千万
[1:19:05]	and he collected 161 million dollars in severance.	他分批次收到一亿六千一百万美金
[1:19:09]	Instead of being fired, Stan O’Neal is allowed to resign	斯坦利·奥尼尔没被解雇 反被允许辞职
[1:19:14]	and takes away 151 million dollars.	还带走一亿五千一百万美金
[1:19:17]	That’s a decision that that board of directors made at that point.	这是董事会当时做出的决定
[1:19:20]	And what grade do you give that decision?	你给这个决定打多少分
[1:19:22]	Uh, that’s a tougher one.	这个比较困难
[1:19:22]	I don’t know if I would give that one a B as well.	这个我可能就不会给”良”了
[1:19:25]	O’Neal’s successor, John Thain,	奥尼尔的继任者约翰·赛恩
[1:19:27]	was paid 87 million dollars in 2007 and in December of 2008,	在2007年获利八千七百万 并于2008年12月
[1:19:33]	two months after Merrill was bailed out by U.S. Taxpayers	也就是美林被纳税人救助之后两个月
[1:19:37]	Thain and Merrill’s board handed out billions in bonuses.	赛恩和美林董事会拿出数十亿美元分红
[1:19:42]	In March of 2008	2008年5月
[1:19:43]		AIG净收入 单位: 十亿
[1:19:44]	AIG’s Financial Products Division lost 11 billion dollars	AIG金融产品部损失110亿美金
[1:19:49]	Instead of being fired, Joseph Cassano, the head of AIGFP	当时的金融产品部主管约瑟夫·卡萨诺并未被解雇
[1:19:53]	was kept on as a consultant	而是作为顾问
[1:19:55]	for a million dollars a month.	拿着几百万月薪留了下来
[1:19:57]	And you want to make sure that the key players	要把核心管理层
[1:19:59]	and the key, key employees, uh, within AIGFP	和核心雇员留在AIG金融产品部
[1:20:03]	yeah, we retain that intellectual knowledge.	是的 我们要把这种智力资源保留
[1:20:05]	I attended a very interesting, uh, dinner,	我出席过一次很有趣的晚宴
[1:20:05]		多米尼克·斯特劳斯-卡恩 国际货币基金总裁
[1:20:07]	organized by Hank Paulson a little more than one year ago	是一年多以前 由亨利·保尔森组织的
[1:20:11]	with some officials and a couple of,uh,	一起出席的还有一些官员和一些
[1:20:13]	CEOs from the biggest, uh, banks in the U.S.	美国大银行的总裁
[1:20:17]	And uh, surprisingly enough, all these gentlemen	出乎意料的是 这些先生
[1:20:20]	were arguing we were too greedy,	都说我们太贪心了
[1:20:23]	so we have part responsibility. Fine.	所以我们也是有部分责任 行
[1:20:26]	And then they were turning to the treasurer,	然后他们又把矛头指向财政部
[1:20:27]	to the secretary of the Treasury,	指向财政部部长
[1:20:29]	and say, you should regulate more because we are too greedy,	说你应该多监管一些 因为我们太贪心了
[1:20:32]	we can’t avoid it.	贪心我们改不了
[1:20:32]	The only way to avoid this is to have more regulation.	所以为避免这种状况 只能多加监管
[1:20:36]	I have spoken to many bankers about this question,	我跟很多银行家谈论过这个问题
[1:20:38]	including very senior ones.	包括一些非常资深的银行家
[1:20:41]	And this is the first time that I’ve ever heard anybody say	这还是我第一次听人说
[1:20:46]	that they actually wanted their compensation to be regulated.	他们希望有人监管自己的薪酬
[1:20:49]	Yeah, because it was at the moment where they were afraid.	对 因为就在那时候 他们害怕了
[1:20:53]	And after, when solution to the crisis began to appear	之后 一旦出现解决危机的办法
[1:20:57]	then probably they, they changed their mind.	他们可能就会改变主意
[1:21:02]	In the U.S., the banks are now bigger, more powerful,	如今美国的银行 规模空前巨大 实力空前雄厚
[1:21:05]	and more concentrated than ever before.	权力空前集中
[1:21:09]	There are fewer competitors, and a lot of smaller banks	他们几乎没有对手 很多小一点的银行
[1:21:10]		马丁·沃尔夫 《金融时报》首席经济评论员
[1:21:12]	have been taken over by big ones.	都被大银行收购了
[1:21:14]	JP Morgan today is even bigger than it was before.	摩根大通如今的规模比以前还要大
[1:21:17]	JP Morgan took over first Bear Stearns and then WAMU	摩根大通先收购了贝尔斯登 然后是华盛顿互惠
[1:21:21]	Bank of America took over Countrywide and Merrill Lynch	美国银行收购了国家金融和美林银行
[1:21:25]	Wells Fargo took over Wachovia.	富国银行收购了美联银行
[1:21:28]	After the crisis, the financial industry	危机过后 金融业
[1:21:31]	including the Financial Services Roundtable	包括金融服务圆桌组织
[1:21:33]	worked harder than ever to fight reform.	愈加致力于反击改革
[1:21:36]	The financial sector employs 3,000 lobbyists	金融业雇佣了三千名说客
[1:21:40]	more than five for each member of Congress.	这个数量比国会成员五倍还多
[1:21:43]	Do you think the financial services industry	你是否认为在美国
[1:21:46]	has excessive political influence in the United States?	金融服务行业的政治影响力过大
[1:21:48]	No. I think that every person in, in the w-,	不 我认为每个人
[1:21:52]	in the country is represented here in Washington.	华府代表了每个公民的利益
[1:21:55]	And you think that all segments of American society	你认为美国社会的各个阶层
[1:21:59]	have equal and fair access to the system?	都有平等机会进入这个体制
[1:22:03]	The, you can walk into any hearing room, uh, that you would like.	听证室对所有人都是开放的
[1:22:06]	Yes, I do.	我认为是平等的
[1:22:08]	Um, one could walk into any hearing room,	听证室确实对所有人开放
[1:22:09]	one can not necessarily write	但不是每个人都能
[1:22:11]	the kind of lobbying checks that your industry writes	像你们行业那样花钱请说客
[1:22:14]	or engage in the level of	或是像你们行业那样
[1:22:16]	political contributions that your industry engages in.	给出到那种数额的政治献金
[1:22:18]	Between 1998 and 2008	在1998年至2008年间
[1:22:21]	the financial industry spent over 5 billion dollars	金融业花费了超过五十亿美金
[1:22:24]	on lobbying and campaign contributions.	用于游说和竞选赞助
[1:22:27]	And since the crisis, they’re spending even more money.	而由于危机的发生 此项花费愈增
[1:22:32]	The financial industry also exerts its influence in a more subtle way	金融业还以一种更加精巧的途径扩大影响
[1:22:35]	one that most Americans don’t know about.	这一途径并不为美国普罗大众所知
[1:22:40]	It has corrupted the study of economics itself.	它已侵染进了金融学本身
[1:22:43]	Deregulation had tremendous financial and intellectual support.	放松管制拥有巨大的经济和智力支持
[1:22:50]	Because, uh, uh, people argued it for their own benefit.	因为人们为了自己的利益极力主张
[1:22:55]	Economics profession was the main source of that illusion.	经济学界是这种假象的主要制造源
[1:23:00]	Since the 1980s, academic economists	自20世纪80年代以来 理论经济学家
[1:23:03]	have been major advocates of deregulation,	就一直是放松管制的主要鼓吹者
[1:23:05]	and played powerful roles in shaping U.S. Government policy.	并在美国政府政策制定中起着重大作用
[1:23:09]	Very few of these economic experts warned about the crisis.	少有经济学专家发出关于危机的警告
[1:23:13]	And even after the crisis,	即使在危机之后
[1:23:15]	many of them opposed reform.	很多专家仍反对改革
[1:23:18]	The guys who taught these things	教授金融学的这些人
[1:23:20]	tended to get paid a lot of money being consultants.	更愿意拿着丰厚薪酬当顾问
[1:23:24]	Business school professors don’t live on a faculty salary.	商学院的教授并不靠教师工资生活
[1:23:30]	They do very, very well.	他们过得非常富足
[1:23:33]	Over the last decade, the financial services industry	在过去十年 金融服务业
[1:23:33]		马丁·费尔德斯坦 哈佛大学经济学教授
[1:23:36]	has made about 5 billion dollars’ worth of	共拿出了50亿美元
[1:23:39]	political contributions in the United States.	用于美国政治献金
[1:23:43]	That’s kind of a lot of money.	那可是一大笔钱
[1:23:45]	That doesn’t bother you?	你不会为此感到不安吗
[1:23:48]	No.	不会
[1:23:50]	Martin Feldstein is a professor at Harvard,	马丁·费尔德斯坦是哈佛大学的教授
[1:23:52]	and one of the world’s most prominent economists.	也是世界上最著名的经济学家之一
[1:23:55]	As President Reagan’s chief economic advisor,	作为里根总统的首席经济顾问
[1:23:57]	he was a major architect of deregulation.	他是放松管制的主要缔造者
[1:24:00]	And from 1988 until 2009, he was	1988年至2009年间 他同时任职于
[1:24:04]	on the board of directors of both AIG and AIG Financial Products,	AIG和AIG金融产品部董事会
[1:24:09]	which paid him millions of dollars.	为此获得百万薪酬
[1:24:11]	You have any regrets about having been on AIG’s board?	你后悔进入AIG的董事会吗
[1:24:15]	I have no comments. No, I have no regrets	无可奉告 不 我不后悔
[1:24:17]	about being on AIG’s board.	任职于AIG的董事会
[1:24:18]	– None. – That I can say, absolutely none. Absolutely none.	-没有 -我能说一点都没有
[1:24:22]	Okay. Um,	好的 那
[1:24:26]	You have any regrets about, uh, AIG’s decisions?	对于AIG的决策你是否有遗憾
[1:24:31]	I cannot say anything more about AIG.	我不想再讨论AIG了
[1:24:33]	I’ve taught at Northwestern and Chicago,	我曾任教于西北大学 芝加哥大学
[1:24:34]		格伦.哈伯德 布什政府首席经济顾问 哥伦比亚商学院院长
[1:24:36]	Harvard and Columbia.	哈佛大学和哥伦比亚大学
[1:24:38]	Glenn Hubbard is the dean of Columbia Business School and was the	格伦.哈伯德现任哥伦比亚大学商学院院长
[1:24:41]	chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers under George W. Bush.	曾任布什政府经济顾问委员会主席
[1:24:46]	Do you think the financial services industry	你是否认为在美国
[1:24:48]	has too much, uh, political power in the United States?	金融服务行业的政治影响力过大
[1:24:53]	I don’t think so, no. You certainly,	我不这么认为 很显然
[1:24:55]	you certainly wouldn’t get that impression	金融业经常在华府受挫
[1:24:57]	by the drubbing that they regularly get, uh, in Washington.	根据这一点就显然得不出这个结论
[1:25:01]	Many prominent academics quietly make fortunes while helping	很多杰出学者通过帮金融业策划公众议题
[1:25:04]	the financial industry shape public debate and government policy.	帮助政府制定政策不声不响地赚了大钱
[1:25:08]	The Analysis Group,	安诺国际咨询公司
[1:25:10]	Charles River Associates,	查尔斯·里弗顾问公司
[1:25:12]	Compass Lexecon,	Compass Lexecon咨询公司
[1:25:14]	and the Law and Economics Consulting Group	还有法律经济咨询集团
[1:25:16]	manage a multi-billion-dollar industry	经营着一项价值几十亿的产业
[1:25:18]	that provides academic experts for hire.	专为各大公司提供学术专家
[1:25:21]	Two bankers who used these services	接受这一服务的银行家中有两位
[1:25:23]	were Ralph Cioffi and Matthew Tannin,	分别是拉尔夫·乔菲和马修·坦尼
[1:25:27]	Bear Stearns hedge fund managers	他们是贝尔斯登对冲基金经理
[1:25:29]	prosecuted for securities fraud.	因证券欺诈被提起公诉
[1:25:31]	After hiring The Analysis Group,	雇佣安诺国际咨询公司后
[1:25:33]	both were acquitted.	他们都被无罪释放
[1:25:35]	Glenn Hubbard was paid 100,000 dollars	格伦.哈伯德因出庭作证为其辩护
[1:25:37]	to testify in their defense.	获得十万美金
[1:25:40]	Do you think that the economics discipline has, uh,	你认为经济学这门学科
[1:25:41]		格伦.哈伯德 布什政府首席经济顾问 哥伦比亚商学院院长
[1:25:44]	a conflict of interest problem?	有利益冲突问题吗
[1:25:47]	I’m not sure I know what you mean.	我不太清楚你什么意思
[1:25:49]	Do you think that a significant fraction of the economics discipline,	经济学科中很大一部分
[1:25:52]	a number of economists, have financial conflicts of interests	以及许多经济学家都牵涉利益纠葛
[1:25:56]	that in some way might call into question or color	你认为这是否会在某种程度上引起质疑或是…
[1:25:59]	Oh, I see what you’re saying. I doubt it.	我明白你的意思 但我不这样想
[1:26:01]	You know, most academic economists,	大多数经济学家
[1:26:02]	uh, you know, aren’t wealthy business people.	并不是富有的商界人士
[1:26:07]	Hubbard makes 250,000 dollars a year	哈伯德作为大都会人寿保险董事
[1:26:09]	as a board member of Met Life	年薪25万美元
[1:26:11]	and was formerly on the board of Capmark,	之前供职于嘉迈资融公司董事会
[1:26:13]	a major commercial mortgage lender during the bubble,	一家诞生于泡沫经济中的商业借贷公司
[1:26:16]	which went bankrupt in 2009.	于2009年破产
[1:26:19]	He has also advised Nomura Securities,	他还是野村证券
[1:26:21]	KKR Financial Corporation,	KKR金融集团
[1:26:23]	and many other financial firms.	还有很多其它金融公司的顾问
[1:26:27]	Laura Tyson, who declined to be interviewed for this film,	劳拉·泰森 拒绝了本片的采访
[1:26:30]	is a professor at the University of California, Berkeley.	她是加州大学伯克利分校的教授
[1:26:34]	She was the chair of the Council of Economic Advisers,	她先后供职于克林顿政府经济顾问协会
[1:26:37]	and then director of the National Economic Council	和国家经济委员会
[1:26:39]	in the Clinton administration.	担任主席
[1:26:41]	Shortly after leaving government,	离开政府部门不久
[1:26:43]	she joined the board of Morgan Stanley	她就加入了摩根·斯坦利董事会
[1:26:45]	which pays her 350,000 dollars a year.	年薪35万美元
[1:26:49]	Ruth Simmons, the president of Brown University,	鲁斯·西蒙斯 布朗大学校长
[1:26:52]	makes over 300,000 dollars a year	供职于高盛公司董事会
[1:26:54]	on the board of Goldman Sachs.	年薪30万美元
[1:26:56]	Larry Summers, who as Treasury secretary	拉里·萨默斯 作为财政部长
[1:26:59]	played a critical role in the deregulation of derivatives	在推行衍生品市场自由化中扮演了重要角色
[1:27:02]	became president of Harvard in 2001	于2001年就任哈佛大学校长
[1:27:06]	While at Harvard,	他任职哈佛大学期间
[1:27:07]	he made millions consulting to hedge funds	为对冲基金咨询获利上百万
[1:27:09]	and millions more in speaking fees,	演说费则更加丰厚
[1:27:11]	much of it from investment banks.	其中多由投行支付
[1:27:17]	According to his federal disclosure report,	根据关于他的联邦调查报告
[1:27:19]	Summers’s net worth is between 16.5	萨默斯的净资产在1650万
[1:27:22]	million and 39.5 million dollars.	到3950万美元之间
[1:27:26]	Frederic Mishkin, who returned to Columbia Business School	弗雷德里克·米什金 在离开美联储之后
[1:27:28]	after leaving the Federal Reserve,	回到了哥伦比亚商学院
[1:27:30]	reported on his federal disclosure report	他的联邦调查报告显示其净资产
[1:27:33]	that his net worth was between 6 million and 17 million dollars.	在600万到1700万美元之间
[1:27:38]	In 2006, you coauthored a study	2006年 你以共同一作的身份
[1:27:38]		弗雷德里克·米什金 美联储理事(2006-2008) 哥伦比亚大学商学院教授
[1:27:40]	– of Iceland’s financial system. – Right, right.	-发表了关于冰岛金融体系的报告 -没错
[1:27:42]	Iceland is also an advanced country with excellent institutions,	冰岛同样是一个拥有良好基建
[1:27:42]		冰岛金融的稳定性 弗里德里克·米什金&特里格维·赫伯森
[1:27:46]	low corruption, rule of law.	低腐败率和健全法制的国家
[1:27:48]	The economy has already adjusted to financial liberalization	其经济已经适应了金融自由化
[1:27:51]	while prudential regulation	与此同时 审慎的监管
[1:27:53]	and supervision is generally quite strong.	与督导也有非常强有力
[1:27:55]	Yeah. And that was the mistake. That it turns out that, uh,	对 错误就出在这一句上 结果表明
[1:27:59]	that the prudential regulation	冰岛的审慎监管
[1:28:00]	and supervision was not strong in Iceland.	和督导并不是很有力
[1:28:02]	And particularly during this period…	尤其是在这个时期
[1:28:03]	So what led you to think that it was?	那你当时为什么这么想
[1:28:05]	I think that, uh, you’re going with the information you have at	根据当时的所掌握的信息
[1:28:07]	and generally, uh, the view was that, that, uh,	还有所看到的
[1:28:11]	Iceland had very good institutions.	冰岛确实拥有良好基建
[1:28:13]	It was a very advanced country	它也曾是一个非常发达的国家
[1:28:15]	Who told you that? Who did, what kind of research did you do?	你是怎么知道的 你做了什么样的研究
[1:28:18]	you, you talk to people,	跟人交流所得
[1:28:19]	you have faith in, in, uh the Central Bank	而且对中央银行有信心
[1:28:21]	which actually did fall down on the job.	但它最后马失前蹄了
[1:28:22]	Uh, that, uh, clearly, it, this, uh	很显然 这个吧
[1:28:26]	Why do you have “Faith” in a central bank?	你为什么会对中央银行有信心
[1:28:28]	Well, that faith, you, ya, d-, because you ha-,	这种信心吧 来源于
[1:28:31]	go with the information you have.	我所掌握的信息
[1:28:32]	Um, how much were you paid to write it?	写这篇文章你得到了多少稿酬
[1:28:33]	I was paid, uh, I think the number was, uh,	我得到了…我想具体的数额
[1:28:36]	it’s public information	你是可以查到的
[1:28:37]		弗里德里克·米什金因撰写这篇论文 从冰岛商业协会得到了12万4千美元的报酬
[1:28:45]	Uh, on your CV, the title of this report has been	在你的简历中 这个报告的题目
[1:28:48]	changed from “Financial Stability	从《冰岛金融的稳定性》
[1:28:49]	in Iceland” To “Financial Instability in Iceland.”	变成了《冰岛金融的不稳定性》
[1:28:52]	Oh. Well, I don’t know, if, itch-, whatever it is, is, the, uh	我不知道这事 我估计吧
[1:28:54]	thing ?If it’s a typo, there’s a typo.	这应该是印刷错误 没错 是这样
[1:28:57]		格伦·哈伯德 哥伦比亚商学院院长
[1:28:57]	I think what should be publicly available is	我认为有一点必须公开
[1:28:59]	whenever anybody does research on a topic	那就是不论任何人做何种研究
[1:29:02]	they disclose if they have	研究者必须说明他们自身
[1:29:03]	any financial conflict with that research.	与这个研究课题是否有利益冲突
[1:29:06]	But if I recall, there is no policy to that effect.	但我记得没有特别针对这种情况的政策
[1:29:11]	I can’t imagine anybody not doing that	在我看来 发表文章的时候
[1:29:14]	in terms of putting it in a paper.	大家都会遵守这一点
[1:29:17]	You would, there would be significant	如果有违反的话
[1:29:18]	professional sanction for failure to do that.	会受到业界严厉制裁
[1:29:20]	I didn’t see any place in the study where	在这篇文章中
[1:29:22]	you indicated that you had been paid, uh,	没见你提起之所以撰写此文
[1:29:25]	by the Icelandic Chamber of Commerce to produce it.	是受冰岛商业协会之托 且收受了报酬
[1:29:28]	– No, I – Okay.	-对 没提 -好的
[1:29:31]	Richard Portes, the most famous economist in Britain	理查德·波茨 英国最著名的经济学家
[1:29:35]	and a professor at London Business School	也是伦敦商学院教授
[1:29:37]	was also commissioned by	在2007年
[1:29:37]		冰岛金融业的国际化 波茨&巴尔迪松
[1:29:39]	the Icelandic Chamber of Commerce in 2007	他同样受冰岛商业协会所托
[1:29:42]	to write a report which praised the Icelandic financial sector	撰写了一份赞誉冰岛金融业的报告
[1:29:46]	The banks themselves are highly liquid.	银行本身有很好的贴现能力
[1:29:48]	They’ve actually made money on the fall of the Icelandic krona.	他们在冰岛克朗贬值时依旧盈利
[1:29:51]	These are strong banks, their funding,	他们是有实力的银行 他们的基金
[1:29:53]	their market funding is assured for the coming year.	和市场基金来年依然坚挺
[1:29:56]	These are well-run banks.	他们的运营情况非常好
[1:29:57]	Richard, thank you so much.	理查德 非常感谢
[1:29:58]	Like Mishkin, Portes’s report	与米什金一样 波茨在报告中
[1:30:00]	didn’t disclose his payment	也没有公开
[1:30:02]	from the Icelandic Chamber of Commerce.	他从冰岛商业协会得到报酬这一事实
[1:30:04]	Does Harvard require disclosures	哈佛大学有要求作者在发表论文时
[1:30:05]		约翰·坎贝尔 哈佛经济学院主席
[1:30:06]	of financial conflict of interest in publications?	公开其中的利益瓜葛吗
[1:30:09]	Um, not to my knowledge.	据我所知没有
[1:30:12]	Do you require people to report the compensation	你会要求学者们公开因走穴活动
[1:30:15]	– they received from outside activities? – No	-而获得的报酬吗 -不会
[1:30:18]	Don’t you think that’s a problem?	你难道不觉得这有问题吗
[1:30:20]	I don’t see why.	我不觉得
[1:30:21]	Martin Feldstein being on the board of AIG	马丁·费尔德斯坦身处AIG董事会
[1:30:24]	Laura Tyson going on the board of Morgan Stanley	劳拉·泰森身处摩根·斯坦利董事会
[1:30:26]	Larry Summers making 10 million dollars a year	拉里·萨默斯担任金融服务公司顾问
[1:30:27]	consulting to financial services firms	年入一千万
[1:30:31]	irrelevant	无关紧要吗
[1:30:33]	Well ?Yeah, basically irrelevant.	是的 可以说无关紧要
[1:30:36]	You’ve written a very large number of articles	你撰写了很多文章
[1:30:36]		马丁·费尔德斯 AIG&AIG金融产品部董事 哈佛经济学教授
[1:30:38]	about a very wide array of subjects.	涉及的领域很广
[1:30:40]	You never saw fit to investigate the risks	你从来不觉得应该调查一下
[1:30:44]	of unregulated credit default swaps?	自由化信用违约互换的风险吗
[1:30:47]	I never did.	从来不觉得
[1:30:49]	Same question with regard to executive compensation	同样的 关于高管薪酬你的看法呢
[1:30:53]	the regulation of corporate governance	公司行政管理呢
[1:30:55]	the effect of political contributions…	政治献金的影响呢
[1:30:57]	What, uh, what, uh, w-,	你到底要问什么
[1:30:58]	I don’t know that I would have anything	关于这些话题
[1:31:00]	to add to those discussions.	我没什么好说的
[1:31:02]	I’m looking at your resume now.	我手上有份你的简历
[1:31:05]	It looks to me as if the majority	看起来你除教职之外
[1:31:07]	of your outside activities are, uh	在外主要是担任
[1:31:11]	consulting and directorship arrangements with	金融服务业顾问
[1:31:12]	the financial services industry.	或者是从事管理工作
[1:31:15]	Is that, would you not agree with that characterization?	你对这种描述有异议吗
[1:31:17]	No, to my knowledge,	不同意 据我所知
[1:31:18]	I don’t think my consulting clients	我的简历上并没有列出
[1:31:19]	are even on my CV, so	我为之提供咨询的客户
[1:31:21]	Uh, who are your consulting clients?	那么你都为哪些客户提供咨询
[1:31:24]	I don’t believe I have to discuss that with you.	我认为没必要跟你说这个
[1:31:26]	Okay.	好吧
[1:31:28]	Look, you have a few more minutes, and the interview is over	再过几分钟采访就要结束了
[1:31:32]	Do you consult for any financial services firms?	你担任过金融服务公司的顾问吗
[1:31:34]	Uh, the answer is, I do.	担任过
[1:31:37]	– And… – And, but I d-,	-那么…-但是
[1:31:38]	I do not want to go into details about that.	关于这点 我不想详谈
[1:31:41]	Do they include other financial services firms?	是否包括其它金融服务公司
[1:31:42]	Possibly.	有可能
[1:31:45]	You don’t remember?	你不记得了吗
[1:31:47]	This isn’t a deposition, sir.	先生 这不是在审讯
[1:31:48]	I was polite enough to give you time,	让你采访已经给你面子了
[1:31:50]	foolishly, I now see.	现在看来 真是犯傻
[1:31:52]	But you have three more minutes.	但你还有三分钟时间
[1:31:54]	Give it your best shot.	好好利用
[1:31:56]	In 2004, at the height of the bubble,	2004年 也就是泡沫经济的最顶峰
[1:31:59]	Glenn Hubbard coauthored a widely read paper	格伦·哈伯德与威廉·C·杜德利合作发表了
[1:32:01]	with William C. Dudley	一篇广为人知的文章
[1:32:03]	the chief economist of Goldman Sachs.	后者是高盛集团首席经济学家
[1:32:06]	In the paper, Hubbard praised credit derivatives	在文章中 哈伯德盛赞信用衍生产品
[1:32:09]	and the securitization chain	以及证券链
[1:32:11]	stating that they had improved allocation of capital,	声称他们改善了资本分配
[1:32:13]	and were enhancing financial stability.	提高了金融稳定性
[1:32:16]	He cited reduced volatility in the economy	他称赞其抑制了经济的波动性
[1:32:18]	and stated that recessions	同时表示经济衰退
[1:32:20]	had become less frequent and milder.	已经逐渐减少变弱
[1:32:23]	Credit derivatives were protecting banks against losses	信用衍生产品保护了银行免于破产
[1:32:26]	and helping to distribute risk.	并分散了风险
[1:32:30]	A medical researcher writes an article, saying:	如果一位医学研究者撰文道
[1:32:30]		约翰·坎贝尔 哈佛经济学院主席
[1:32:34]	to treat this disease, you should prescribe this drug.	要治这个病就必须服用这个药
[1:32:39]	It turns out Doctor makes 80 percent of	而事实上医生百分之八十的收入
[1:32:41]	personal income from manufacturer of this drug.	都来自于该药的生产商
[1:32:44]	Does not bother you?	你不觉得不妥吗
[1:32:46]	I think, uh, it’s certainly important to disclose	我觉得 开诚布公当然很重要
[1:32:56]	Well, I think that’s also a little different from cases	但这和我们现在所说的事情
[1:32:58]	that we are talking about here. Because, um ?Um	还是有些区别的 因为…
[1:33:05]		哈佛大学和哥伦比亚大学校长 均拒绝对学术利益瓜葛发表评论
[1:33:17]	So, uh, what do you think this says	你认为这反映了
[1:33:18]		查尔斯·莫里斯 《两万亿的消融》作者
[1:33:19]	about the economics discipline?	经济学科一个什么样的现状
[1:33:21]	Well, heh heh, it has no relevance to anything, really	这其实没什么关系
[1:33:26]	And indeed, I think, um, it’s a part of the, it’s a	事实上 我想 它是整个问题…
[1:33:31]	important part of the problem	非常重要的一部分
[1:33:49]	The rising power of the U.S. Financial sector	美国金融业的日渐强势
[1:33:51]	was part of a wider change in America.	是美国大变革背景的一部分
[1:33:55]	Since the 1980s, the United States has become	自上世纪80年代起 美国社会
[1:33:58]	a more unequal society,	便愈加不平等
[1:34:00]	and its economic dominance has declined.	其经济优势也在衰退
[1:34:04]	Companies like General Motors, Chrysler, and U.S. Steel	如通用汽车 克莱斯勒 美国钢材
[1:34:08]	formerly the core of the U.S. Economy were poorly managed	这些曾是美国经济核心的企业 因经营不善
[1:34:12]	and falling behind their foreign competitors.	落在了国外竞争者的后面
[1:34:16]	And as countries like China opened their economies,	随着中国等国家经济的开放
[1:34:19]	American companies sent jobs overseas to save money.	美国公司为节省开支而将工厂移至海外
[1:34:26]	For many, many years,	很多年以来
[1:34:27]	the 660 million people in the developed world	发达国家里的六亿六千万人民
[1:34:30]	were effectively sheltered	相比于这个星球上
[1:34:31]	from all of this additional labor	其他国家的劳动力
[1:34:34]	that existed on the planet	得到了有效的庇护
[1:34:35]	Suddenly, the Bamboo Curtain and the Iron Curtain are lifted	突然间 这些庇护全部消失
[1:34:39]	and you have 2.5 billion additional people	一瞬间多出了25亿劳动力
[1:34:43]	American factory workers were laid off by the tens of thousands	成千上万的美国工人被裁
[1:34:47]	Our manufacturing base was destroyed,	我们的制造业基础
[1:34:49]	literally over the course of a few years.	在几年内便土崩瓦解
[1:34:51]	As manufacturing declined, other industries rose.	制造业衰退的同时 其他产业也在崛起
[1:34:55]	The United States leads the world in information technology,	美国作为信息产业的世界领头羊
[1:34:58]	where high-paying jobs are easy to find.	其中高薪职位俯仰即是
[1:35:02]	But those jobs require an education.	但这些职位都需要高学历
[1:35:04]	And for average Americans,	而对于普通美国人来说
[1:35:06]	college is increasingly out of reach.	大学变得越来越遥不可及
[1:35:09]	While top private universities like Harvard	像哈佛大学这样的顶级私立大学
[1:35:10]		哈佛大学捐助增长 (单位: 十亿)
[1:35:12]	have billions of dollars in their endowments	能够获得数十亿的捐助
[1:35:15]	funding for public universities is shrinking,	而对公立大学的拨款不断缩水
[1:35:18]	and tuition is rising.	学费则不断上涨
[1:35:20]	Tuition for California’s public universities	加州公立大学的学费
[1:35:23]	rose from 650 dollars in the 1970s	在70年代只有650美元
[1:35:26]	to over 10,000 dollars in 2010.	而在2010年则涨到了1万美元
[1:35:30]	Increasingly, the most important determinant	逐渐地 美国人能否上大学
[1:35:33]	of whether Americans go to college	决定性因素变成了
[1:35:35]	is whether they can find the money to pay for it.	他是否承担得起学费
[1:35:38]	Meanwhile, American tax policy shifted	与此同时 美国税收政策
[1:35:41]	to favor the wealthy	逐渐倒向富人
[1:35:43]	When I first came to office,	当我刚上任时
[1:35:45]	I thought taxes were too high, and they were.	便认为税收太高了 事实也的确如此
[1:35:49]	The most dramatic change	其中最引人注目的改变
[1:35:50]	was a series of tax cuts designed by Glenn Hubbard	便是由时任布什政府首席经济顾问的
[1:35:53]	who at the time was serving	格伦·哈伯德所设计的
[1:35:55]	as President Bush’s chief economic advisor	一系列的减税政策
[1:35:58]	The Bush administration	布什政府
[1:35:59]	sharply reduced taxes on investment gains,	大幅削减了投资收益税
[1:36:02]	stock dividends,	以及股息税
[1:36:03]	and eliminated the estate tax.	并取消了土地税
[1:36:05]	We had a comprehensive plan	我们经过了全面规划
[1:36:08]	that, when acted has left nearly $1.1 trillion dollors	实施后 已为美国工人家庭
[1:36:11]	in the hands of American workers families, investors,	投资者和小型商业主们
[1:36:13]	and small business owners.	省下了1万1千亿美元税收
[1:36:15]	Most of the benefits of these tax cuts	减税政策带来的优惠绝大部分进入了
[1:36:18]	went to the wealthiest 1 percent of Americans.	美国前百分之一的富裕阶层的口袋
[1:36:22]	And by the way, it was really the cornerstone,	同时 这为我们的经济复苏政策
[1:36:24]	in many ways, of our economic recovery policy.	巩固了基础 且其巩固作用体现在各方面
[1:36:27]	Inequality of wealth in the United States	美国的贫富差距
[1:36:30]	is now higher than in any other developed country.	已经超过了其它所有发达国家
[1:36:34]	American families responded to these changes in two ways:	美国人民只有两种方式应变
[1:36:38]	by working longer hours, and by going into debt.	要么拉长工时 要么负债累累
[1:36:43]	As the middle class falls further and further behind,	由于中产阶级逐渐衰落
[1:36:46]	there is a political urge to respond	政治上迫切需要给出对策
[1:36:51]	by making it easier to get credit.	即放宽贷款标准
[1:36:54]	You don’t have to have a lousy home.	你们不必住在破房子里
[1:36:56]	The low-income home buyer	低收入的购房者
[1:36:58]	can have just as nice a house as anybody else.	同样可以拥有舒适的房子
[1:37:03]	American families borrowed to finance their homes	美国家庭贷款买房
[1:37:03]		美国人均家庭贷款 (根据通胀调整后)
[1:37:06]	their cars, their healthcare,	买车 买医疗保险
[1:37:08]	and their children’s educations.	供孩子上学
[1:37:11]	People in the bottom 90 percent	美国后百分之九十阶层
[1:37:15]	lost ground between 1980 and 2007	在1980到2007年间逐渐破产
[1:37:20]	It all went to the top 1 percent	钱全部流入前百分之一阶层
[1:37:26]	For the first time in history,	历史上第一次出现
[1:37:28]	average Americans have less education and are less prosperous	普通美国人的教育程度和发展前景
[1:37:32]	than their parents	不如父辈们
[1:37:36]	The era of greed	过去这些年
[1:37:37]	and irresponsibility on Wall Street and in Washington	华尔街与华府贪婪且缺乏责任感
[1:37:42]	has led us to a financial crisis as serious as	因此引发了自经济大萧条以来
[1:37:46]	any that we have faced since the Great Depression.	最严重的金融危机
[1:37:49]	When the financial crisis struck just before the 2008 election	金融危机爆发时 适逢2008年大选
[1:37:53]	Barack Obama pointed to Wall Street greed	巴拉克·奥巴马抛出华尔街的贪欲
[1:37:55]	and regulatory failures	和监管缺失
[1:37:57]	as examples of the need for change in America.	作为美国亟需改革的反面教材
[1:37:59]	A lack of oversight in Washington	华府和华尔街
[1:38:01]	and on Wall Street is exactly	在监管上的失职
[1:38:03]	what got us into this mess.	是金融危机的元凶
[1:38:06]	After taking office, President Obama	入主白宫后 奥巴马总统
[1:38:08]	spoke of the need to reform the financial industry.	提出金融业改革的必要性
[1:38:11]	We want a systemic-risk regulator,	我们要对系统风险进行监管
[1:38:13]	increased capital requirements	增加资本限制条件
[1:38:14]	We need a consumer financial protection agency	还需要消费者金融保险机构
[1:38:17]	We need to change Wall Street’s culture.	我们要改变华尔街的面貌
[1:38:19]	But when finally enacted in mid-2010	但到2010年年中制定法案时
[1:38:23]	the administration’s financial reforms were weak	政府金融改革却力度薄弱
[1:38:25]	and in some critical areas, including the rating agencies	在一些关键领域 包括评价机构
[1:38:29]	lobbying, and compensation	游说政治和薪金水平方面
[1:38:30]	nothing significant was even proposed	甚至连提案中都鲜有强力政策
[1:38:34]	Addressing Obama and, quote, regulatory reform:	关于他的监管改革请致奥巴马 就用这句原话
[1:38:38]	my response, if it was one word, would be: Ha!	在我看来 一言以蔽之 就是”笑话”
[1:38:43]	There is very little reform	根本谈不上什么改革
[1:38:46]	How come?	为什么
[1:38:47]	It’s a Wall Street government	政府与华尔街是一丘之貉
[1:38:54]	Obama chose Timothy Geithner as Treasury secretary	奥巴马钦点蒂姆西·盖特纳为财政部长
[1:38:57]	Geithner was the president of the New York Federal Reserve	盖特纳正是金融危机时
[1:38:59]	during the crisis	纽约美联储的总裁
[1:39:01]	and one of the key players	同时也是做出
[1:39:02]	in the decision to pay Goldman Sachs	付给高盛全额赔偿金
[1:39:04]	100 cents on the dollar	以补偿其在按揭贷款反向投保中的损失
[1:39:05]	for its bets against mortgages.	这一决策的关键人物之一
[1:39:08]	When Tim Geithner was testifying	当蒂姆·盖特纳宣誓就任
[1:39:11]	to be confirmed as Treasury secretary	财政部长时 他说道
[1:39:13]	“I have never been a regulator”	“我从未担任过监管工作”
[1:39:16]	Now that said to me, he did not understand his job	在我看来 他并没有弄明白
[1:39:19]	as president of the New York Fed.	纽约美联储总裁算什么工作
[1:39:25]	The new president of the New York Fed is William C. Dudley,	纽约美联储的新任总裁是威廉·C·杜德利
[1:39:29]	the former chief economist of Goldman Sachs	前高盛集团首席经济学家
[1:39:31]	whose paper with Glenn Hubbard praised derivatives.	他与格伦·哈伯德合作发表文章盛赞衍生产品
[1:39:35]	Geithner’s chief of staff is Mark Paterson	盖特纳的幕僚长是马克·帕特森
[1:39:37]	a former lobbyist for Goldman	后者曾是高盛集团说客
[1:39:40]	and one of the senior advisors is Lewis Sachs	路易斯·萨奇斯则担任资深顾问
[1:39:42]	who oversaw Tricadia	他曾经掌管Tricadia资产
[1:39:44]	a company heavily involved in betting against	一家深陷对自己出售的按揭贷款
[1:39:46]	the mortgage securities it was selling.	进行反向投保泥潭的金融公司
[1:39:50]	To head the Commodity Futures Trading Commission	商品期货交易委员会的负责人
[1:39:52]	Obama picked Gary Gensler – a former Goldman Sachs executive	奥巴马选择了前高盛主管加里·金斯勒
[1:39:56]	who had helped ban the regulation of derivatives	他曾协助禁止监管衍生产品
[1:39:59]	To run the Securities and Exchange Commission	对于证券交易委员会
[1:40:02]	Obama picked Mary Shapiro	奥巴马选择了玛丽·查普诺
[1:40:04]	the former CEO of FINRA	FINRA前CEO
[1:40:06]	the investment-banking industry’s self-regulation body	一家投资银行业自律监管机构
[1:40:10]	Obama’s chief of staff, Rahm Emanuel	奥巴马的幕僚长拉姆·伊曼纽尔
[1:40:12]	made 320,000 dollars serving on the board of Freddie Mac	供职房地美董事会期间 赚得32万美元
[1:40:17]	Both Martin Feldstein and Laura Tyson	马丁·费尔德斯坦和劳拉·泰森
[1:40:20]	are members of Obama’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board.	都成了奥巴马经济复苏委员会的成员
[1:40:23]	And Obama’s chief economic advisor is Larry Summers	奥巴马的首席经济顾问是拉里·萨默斯
[1:40:29]	The most senior economic advisors	最资深的经济顾问
[1:40:31]	are the very people who were there, who built the structure.	就是最初构建这一体系的人
[1:40:34]	When it was clear that Summers and Geithner	当我知道萨默斯和盖特纳
[1:40:37]	were going to play major roles as advisors	将成为重要顾问时
[1:40:41]	I knew this was going to be status quo.	我就明白 一切都会保持现状
[1:40:44]	The Obama administration resisted regulation of bank compensation	奥巴马政府拒绝对银行薪金进行监管
[1:40:48]	even as foreign leaders took action.	即便其他国家已经有所行动
[1:40:51]	I think the financial industry is a service industry	我认为金融业是服务行业
[1:40:53]	it should serve others before it serves itself.	它应当首先服务他人
[1:40:58]	In September of 2009,	2009年9月
[1:40:59]	Christine Lagarde and the finance ministers of Sweden,	克里斯汀.拉嘉德联合瑞典 荷兰 卢森堡
[1:41:02]	the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, Spain, and Germany	意大利 西班牙 德国的财政部长
[1:41:07]	called for the G20 nations, including the United States	呼吁包括美国在内的G20国家
[1:41:10]	to impose strict regulations on bank compensation	加强对银行薪酬的严厉监管
[1:41:14]	And in July of 2010,	2010年7月
[1:41:16]	the European Parliament enacted those very regulations	欧洲议会通过了这项监管法案
[1:41:21]	The Obama administration had no response	奥巴马政府对此没有回应
[1:41:24]	Their view is, this is a temporary blip	奥巴马政府认为这都是暂时的
[1:41:27]	and things will go back to normal	一切都会回归正轨
[1:41:28]	And that is why I am reappointing him	因此我再次任命他
[1:41:31]	to another term as chairman of the Federal Reserve	继续留任下一届美联储主席
[1:41:34]	Thank you so much, Ben.	谢谢你 本
[1:41:35]	In 2009, Barack Obama reappointed Ben Bernanke	2009年巴拉克·奥巴马再次任命本·伯南克
[1:41:39]	Thank you, Mr. President	谢谢 总统先生
[1:41:40]	As of mid-2010, not a single senior financial executive	到2010年年中 没有一个金融高管
[1:41:45]	had been criminally prosecuted,	被刑事起诉
[1:41:48]	or even arrested	连逮捕也没有
[1:41:49]	no special prosecutor had been appointed	没有指派任何特别检察官
[1:41:51]	not a single financial firm	甚至没有一家公司
[1:41:53]	had been prosecuted criminally for securities fraud or accounting fraud	被以证券欺诈或账目造假罪名刑事起诉
[1:41:58]	The Obama administration has made no attempt	奥巴马政府也从未试图
[1:42:00]	to recover any of the compensation	收回在经济泡沫时期
[1:42:02]	given to financial executives during the bubble	发给金融高管们的薪金
[1:42:07]	I certainly would think of criminal action	我本以为会对国家金融的高管
[1:42:10]	against some of Countrywide’s top leaders	进行刑事诉讼
[1:42:13]	like Mozilo	比如莫兹罗
[1:42:14]	I’d certainly look at Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs	还有贝尔斯登 高盛
[1:42:17]	and Lehman Brothers, and Merrill Lynch	雷曼兄弟和美林
[1:42:20]	– For criminal prosecutions. – Yes. Yes.	-刑事起诉吗 -没错
[1:42:24]	They’d be very hard to, to win.	要胜诉很难
[1:42:26]	But I think they could do it	但我觉得应该一试
[1:42:28]	if they got enough underlings to tell the truth	只要有足够多的下属愿意说出实情
[1:42:33]	In an industry in which drug use, prostitution,	整个行业都参与吸毒和嫖娼
[1:42:35]	and fraudulent billing of prostitutes as a business expense	且这些勾当都假以”业务支出”名义报销
[1:42:38]	occur on an industrial scale.	金融就是这样一个行业
[1:42:40]	it wouldn’t be hard to make people talk,	如果你真想找到说实话的人
[1:42:42]	if you really wanted to.	应该不太难
[1:42:45]	They gave me a plea bargain, and I took it.	他们给了我认罪协议 我答应了
[1:42:48]	Um, they were not interested in any of my records	他们对我的记录并不感兴趣
[1:42:50]	they weren’t interested in anything.	他们对这些都不感兴趣
[1:42:52]	They were not interested in your records?	他们对你的记录并不感兴趣
[1:42:54]	That’s correct. That’s correct.	没错 没错
[1:42:56]	There is a sensibility that you don’t use people’s	需要留一点情面 处理华尔街案件
[1:42:59]	personal vices in the context of Wall Street cases	没不必要扯出个人作风问题
[1:43:04]	necessarily to get them to flip	惹恼他们
[1:43:06]	I think maybe it’s,	也许
[1:43:08]	after the cataclysms that we’ve been through	度过这场灾难后
[1:43:10]	maybe people will reevaluate that	人们对此会重新评价
[1:43:12]	I’m not the one to pass judgment on that right now.	现在我无权对其作出评判
[1:43:18]		2008年联邦检察官倒是非常乐意 以个人作风问题为由向其施压 强迫埃利奥特·斯皮策辞去州长一职
[1:43:22]		而对待华尔街人士 他们就没有这种劲头了
[1:43:29]	You come to us today, telling us:	你们今天来 告诉我们
[1:43:32]	We’re sorry, We didn’t mean it	我们很抱歉 我们不是故意的
[1:43:34]	We won’t do it again, trust us.	我们会改的 相信我们吧
[1:43:38]	Well, I have some people in my constituency	好吧 我的选民里也有些人
[1:43:41]	that actually robbed some of your banks	抢过你们的银行
[1:43:44]	And they say the same thing!	他们也像你们这样说
[1:43:46]	They’re sorry, they didn’t mean it.	他们很抱歉 他们不是故意的
[1:43:48]	They won’t do it again.	他们再也不敢了
[1:43:50]	In 2009, as unemployment hit its highest level in 17 years	2009年 当失业率达到17年来最高点时
[1:43:55]	Morgan Stanley paid its employees over 14 billion dollars	摩根士丹利付给员工的薪酬超过140亿美元
[1:43:58]	and Goldman Sachs paid out over 16 billion	高盛则超过160亿
[1:44:01]	In 2010, bonuses were even higher	2010年 奖金更是丰厚
[1:44:05]	Why should a financial engineer be paid four, four times	为什么一个金融”工程师”的收入
[1:44:11]	to a hundred times more than the, a real engineer?	4倍甚至百倍于一个真正的工程师
[1:44:15]	A real engineer build bridges	真正的工程师建设桥梁
[1:44:18]	a financial engineer build, build dreams	金融工程师构建美梦
[1:44:21]	And when those dream turn out to be nightmares,	然而当美梦变成噩梦时
[1:44:25]	other people pay for it.	却要别人来买单
[1:44:28]	For decades, the American financial system was stable and safe.	几十年来美国金融系统一直稳定而安全
[1:44:34]	But then something changed	但风云突变
[1:44:37]	The financial industry turned its back on society	金融业背叛了社会
[1:44:40]	corrupted our political system,	腐蚀了我们的政治体系
[1:44:42]	and plunged the world economy into crisis	让全世界经济陷入危机
[1:44:48]	At enormous cost, we avoided disaster,	最终我们以惨痛的代价 避免了灾难
[1:44:51]	and are recovering.	如今正休养生息
[1:44:53]	But the men and institutions that caused the crisis	但一手造成危机的人和机构
[1:44:55]	are still in power	仍大权在握
[1:44:57]	and that needs to change.	这一点必须改变
[1:45:00]	They will tell us that we need them	他们会说 我们需要他们
[1:45:03]	and that what they do is too complicated for us to understand	他们的工作太复杂 我们无法理解
[1:45:07]	They will tell us it won’t happen again.	他们会承诺一切不再重演
[1:45:10]	They will spend billions fighting reform.	他们还是会花重金抵制改革
[1:45:14]	It won’t be easy.	前路坎坷
[1:45:18]	But some things are worth fighting for.	但有些东西 值得我们为之一搏